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Recomposed
Covering Conjectures: 
The Intellectual (Hypointellectual)
Bleeds into the Hyperintellectual 
I am not impressed with those who call themsel-
ves intellectuals, or, better yet, public intellectuals. 
The word has become a worn-out title that is often 
appropriated by those who simply gibber on social 
media platforms about the politics and economics 
of the day. Of course, this is not totally unrelated to 
the word’s late-19th century French origin. Coined 
during the Dreyfus affair, the word came to refer to 
those thinkers, people like Emile Zola and André 
Gide, who were willing to intervene in a public fo-
rum even if it meant risk to their personal well-be-
ing (Le Sueur 2001: 2; see also Drake 2005 and 
Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997). Risky as their 
acts were, acts which required a certain amount of 
courage to pull off, it is the “publicity” of these acts 
that gives us cause to label the Zolas and Gides of 
the world as “public intellectuals.” The American 
jurist and legal theorist Richard Posner puts it nice-
ly. Public intellectuals are those who take a seri-
ous interest in “matters of general public concern 
of...a political or ideological cast” and who express 
themselves “in a way that is accessible to the pub-
lic” (2003: 35). And so both Zola and Gide came 
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Abstract
Although hypointellectuals have long 
been a part of our cultural landscape, 
it is in post-conflict societies, such 
as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, that 
there has arisen a strong need for a 
different breed of intellectual, one 
who is more than simply a social crit-
ic, an educator, a person of action, and 
a compassionate individual. Enter the 
non-partisan intellectual—the hy-
perintellectual. It is the hyperintel-
lectual, whose non-partisanship is 
manifested through a reciprocating 
critique and defense of both the na-
tionalist enterprise and strong in-
terventionism of the International 
Community, who strives to create a 
climate of understanding and to en-
large the moral space so as to reduce 
the divisiveness between opposing 
parties. It is in this way that the hy-
perintellectual acts as a catalyst for 
the creation of a democratic culture 
within the civil societies of Bosnia 
and Kosovo.
© 2016 Global Outlook
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forward to make their views known, per-
haps serving as the conscience of French 
society, and propelled by the belief that 
one cannot walk away from some miscar-
riages of justice.
Yet one person’s miscarriage of justice 
is another’s justice (or, in the case of Alfred 
Dreyfus, another person’s prejudice) as 
evidenced by the deep division that the 
Dreyfus affair created in France during the 
1890s and early 1900s, with some thin-
kers, such as the anti-Semite Edouard 
Drumont, publically condemning Dreyfus. 
This shows that not every public intellec-
tual was reading from the same script, 
some were oppositional while others were 
curatorial in their response to the prejudic-
es of the time. Revolutionaries as well as 
reactionaries populated the scene.
Although the days of the French Third 
Republic are long gone, public intellectu-
als and those who take an interest in them 
continue to be plentiful, as well those 
public intellectuals who turn their gaze 
upon themselves in the hope of making 
sense of their own kind (which includes 
someone like Posner).
It is safe to say that with so many in-
terested parties, it is not surprising that 
there is an enormous body of literature on 
public intellectuals. I, for one, have looked 
at only a tiny fraction of the corpus. Be-
sides its sheer size, the literature is also 
quite varied in its conceptions of the in-
tellectual.1 Yet there are common threads 
1 To get a feel for the literature, see, for ex-
ample, Aronowitz (2012); Bamyeh (2012); 
Benda (1928); Bender (1997); Etzioni and 
Bowditch (2006); Faflak and Haslam (2013); 
Hollander (1998); Jacoby (1987); Jennings 
of meaning among those conceptions. 
Influential twentieth century thinkers 
like the Palestinian literary theorist and 
cultural critic Edward Said, the French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the French 
existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, and the 
American political philosopher Michael 
Walzer are among those who have con-
tributed significantly, each highlighting 
some of these threads.2
The language of threads adopted here 
is not meant to indicate support for either 
an essentialist or intersectionist theory of 
identity of the intellectual, though I find 
the latter to possess more explanatory 
power than the former. What it does in-
dicate, however, is that I am treating the 
question “What is an intellectual?” like 
“What is a taxi driver?” It is a question 
about the set of observable conditions 
that are sufficient for someone to be a 
public intellectual. The problem with this 
treatment is there are far fewer clear-cut 
cases of public intellectuals than there are 
clear-cut cases of taxi drivers. This is be-
cause the objections to a specific person 
being an intellectual will likely mount, 
while the reverse is likely to be true with 
those who are said to be taxi drivers. 
This should be no surprise given a cur-
sory reading of Said, Ricoeur, Sartre, and 
and Kemp-Welch (1997); Johnson (2007); 
Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman (2003); 
Posner (2003); Poyner (2006); Shils (1972); 
Small (2002); and Sowell (2012).
2 Said, Sartre, and Walzer are examples of the 
sort of self-reflective public intellectual that 
was previously noted. Ricoeur, on the other 
hand, was more inclined to write for an audi-
ence made up of fellow academics, including 
professional philosophers.  
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Walzer suggests that there are many uses 
of the word ‘intellectual’ compared to that 
of ‘taxi driver’: for example, the intel-
lectual is viewed as a critical outsider by 
Said, as a political educator by Ricoeur, 
as a person of action by Sartre, and as a 
caring insider by Walzer as compared to 
a person who makes a living by driving a 
taxi.3 Yet these threads, when taken to-
gether, constitute what I believe to be an 
adequate definition of one type of run-
of-the-mill intellectual or hypointellec-
tual (its binomen being Publicus intellec-
tualis hypo). There are many other types, 
some of whom may not only be a little 
less critical, less educating, less active, 
and/or less caring, but may not possess 
much of any of these threads. Such an 
intellectual would be just another run-
of-the-mill intellectual, albeit a severe 
type of hypointellectual. I am not in the 
least interested in this “ugly” intellectual, 
and am not very interested in its more 
robust counterpart, except insofar as it 
represents the intellectual who is once 
removed from the centerpiece of this 
work, the quirky intellectual, who I refer 
to as the hyperintellectual (Publicus intel-
lectualis hyper). The quirkiness (or q-ness) 
of the hyperintellectual is derived from a 
commitment to non-partisanship (a lack 
of bias qua one-sidedness but not an ab-
sence of perspectivism), which places the 
hyperintellectual in sharp contrast with 
the hypointellectual. It is in this sense 
3 An instance of a taxi driver may not be as 
clear-cut as it appears. We may consider those 
drivers of cars with pink moustaches who give 
rides free of charge in Omaha, Nebraska as 
fuzzy cases.
that the hyperintellectual is an “anti-in-
tellectual,” the ‘anti’ signifying the hyper-
intellectual’s non-partisanship that makes 
him or her less predictable and formulaic 
than the hypointellectual. 
Describing intellectuals in the way 
that I have, however, fails to mention the 
space within which they operate, i.e., civil 
society. ‘Space’ is an abstract term that 
has more than one meaning and one ref-
erent, including the space that comput-
ers and the Internet have given us access 
to—the electronic medium of cyberspace. 
Yet space is nonetheless readily acces-
sible to us because it is part of our every-
day speech and lived experience. We talk 
about and experience space in different 
ways, one way being “as that which allows 
movement” (Tuan 1977: 6). We enter into 
it and we exit it; we smell, taste, feel, see, 
and communicate as we make our way 
through it. Once we pause, that location 
becomes a place like the one at which 
civil society is made real. Of course, real 
does not always mean humane and sup-
portive of human development, democ-
racy, and peace. Civil society as the space 
of human association and relational net-
works is often made toxic by the xeno-
phobia and chauvinism reflected in hate 
speech and violence. Yet civil society is 
sometimes the wellspring for a culture 
of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and 
the mutually beneficial resolution of con-
flicts; the sort of culture that embodies 
the attitudes and values of democratiza-
tion. Political instrumentalities like free-
dom of expression; free, fair, and frequent 
elections; and procedures to bring about 
peaceful change are crucial for democ-
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racy, but they are only as effective as the 
culture that binds them. It is civil society 
that provides the space within which cul-
ture shapes how people behave politically. 
What we find today are civil societies 
that harbor a mosaic of political cultures 
in continuous tension with one another, 
with some cultures being more supportive 
of democracy than others. For the most 
part, pluralism comes with its own risks of 
repeated contestation. “When we discov-
er that there are several cultures instead 
of just one and consequently at the time 
when we acknowledge the end of a sort of 
cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real,” 
as Ricoeur reminds us, “we are threatened 
with the destruction of our own discov-
ery. Suddenly it becomes possible that 
there are just others, that we ourselves are 
an ‘other’ among others” (1965: 278). And 
with all those others the possibility for 
disagreement and antagonism, and occa-
sionally violence, is but a human constant.
It strikes me that of all the “shakers and 
movers” of culture, the hypointellectual is 
no less important an actor than the rest of 
the lot in well-developed democratic civil 
societies, like those in the United States, 
France, Denmark, and Sweden. When it 
comes to the United States, Posner lo-
cates what he calls “the market for public 
intellectuals” (Posner 2003: 41-82). It is 
a marketplace inhabited by the likes of 
Noam Chomsky, Cornell West, and Paul 
Krugman. The hypointellectual is also an 
important actor in civil societies that are 
far less democratic; sometimes working 
on behalf of and sometimes struggling 
against the time honored constraints of 
authoritarianism (the People’s Republic 
of China, North Korea, and the Russian 
Federation come to mind).
Although the hypointellectual domi-
nates many societies as a force for either 
the status quo or for social change, I find 
extraordinary value in the hyperintellec-
tual. This is even true in well-developed 
democratic civil societies where there 
continues to be a need for an intellectu-
al who is more than simply a social crit-
ic, an educator, a person of action, and a 
compassionate individual who favors one 
side over another. However, it is within 
post-conflict societies, such as those in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, that there exists an 
urgent need for the hyperintellectual. 
What is distinctive about the hyperintel-
lectual is the degree to which this intel-
lectual conducts social criticism, political 
education, action, and “caring insiderism” 
not as an ideologue, but as a non-parti-
san. The tasks of criticism, education, and 
the rest are conducted in a non-partisan 
way such that what is objectionable and 
defensible within each opposing camp is 
given voice.4 Although the hyperintellect 
may appear to be affiliated with a particu-
lar group simply because their position on 
an issue is the same as that of the group 
in question, it is just that, an appearance. 
Over the course of time, while examin-
ing a host of issues, the hyperintellectual 
4 After all is said and done, however, there 
may not be a “best” voice that results from 
reasoning and impartial scrutiny. As Sen so 
succinctly notes: “[e]ven the most vigorous of 
critical examination can still leave conflicting 
and competing arguments that are not elim-
inated by impartial scrutiny” (2009: x). Per-
haps we should be satisfied with a new voice 
that is simply more reasonable.
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will be seen to have shifted “affiliations” 
from one group to another to another, 
siding with conservatives one day, liber-
als the next, and socialists the following 
day. This shifting, however, is evidence 
that the hyperintellectual is not behold-
en to any one stakeholder, whether it is 
a party, organization, or government. This 
is especially important for the building of 
post-conflict civil societies like Kosovo 
and Bosnia because the hyperintellectu-
al is seen as “having no dog in the fight,” 
thus as someone who is sincere about re-
ducing the divisiveness between peoples. 
Whether the tension is between ethnic 
nationalists themselves; between them 
and the strong interventionists from wi-
thin the International Community (IC); 
or between the governed and their cor-
rupt, inept, and greedy elected officials 
and their functionaries—a new set of 
boogie men, it can all be addressed by the 
hyperintellectual so that there is at least a 
growing sense of communities. 
It is worth remarking that to appre-
ciate the pervasiveness and malevolence 
of the divisiveness caused by ethnic na-
tionalism is to recognize how personal 
and group identities are intimately bound 
to the Other and Otherness.5 No wonder 
5 Sari Nusseibeh (2011) recognizes that “‘be-
ing Hamas’ or ‘being Palestinian’…may be-
come such a powerful marker of her identity 
that she ceases to think of herself—to define 
herself—except in terms of belonging to that 
party or movement or category” (106). Yet he 
makes it clear that group identities do not 
always take precedence over personal identi-
ties; furthermore, that “human identities are 
not pre-set or static but are constantly being 
shaped or formed by conscious acts of will” 
(211).   
nationalist elites of all sorts have mat-
ter-of-factly Othered one another; this 
being no less true of nationalists in Kosovo 
and Bosnia. However, there is more to the 
Othering process that meets the eye, for 
at a much deeper level, the process is a re-
flection of a “hierarchical” ontology (i.e., 
the set of things and relationships that 
are said to exist in the world), which casts 
the categories of ethnicity and religion as 
dominant over those of citizenship and 
humanity. Juxtaposing one of these cat-
egories against another for the sake of 
in-group cohesiveness eventually creates 
disdain for the ethnicity and religion of 
the Other, and thus xenophobic psychol-
ogy (fear of the Other) and chauvinistic 
morality (the moral superiority of one’s 
own ethno-religious group) (Conces 
2005). It is all the more pernicious when 
this ontological-psychological-moral tri-
ad is wedded to the history and tradition 
of the Balkans.
Unfortunately, interethnic relations 
and governance in Kosovo and Bosnia in 
some ways have not improved following 
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and the 
signing of The General Framework Agre-
ement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (GFAP), more commonly known as 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), that 
brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia. 
The xenophobia and chauvinism partly 
responsible for thirty years of unrest in 
Kosovo and the Bosnian civicide of the 
1990s continue to polarize Kosovar and 
Bosnian societies, pitting the various 
ethnic groups and their leaders against 
each other, as well as against the IC and 
its strong interventionist efforts in de-
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mocracy building (see Appadurai 2006: 
117-118). The current round of tension 
includes violent clashes between NATO-
led KFOR units, as well as EULEX and 
Kosovo police units, and Serbs in Serb-
controlled municipalities in North Kosovo 
between 2011 and 2012; bomb blasts, 
the shooting of a Serb Councilman, and 
masked men disrupting a polling center 
in north Mitrovica during 2013-14; the 
dysfunctionality within the government 
of the Bosnian city of Mostar, which was 
still without a City Council in April 2015 
because of the municipality’s unconstitu-
tional electoral process; and the veiled se-
cessionist rhetoric occasionally delivered 
by Milorad Dodik, the president of the 
Republika Srpska, and that has put the 
IC and some in Sarajevo in a tenuous sit-
uation regarding their response to prov-
ocations. Then there was the torrent of 
protests that took place in February and 
March 2014 in Bosnia. The rank and file 
of the protestors cut across ethnic lines, 
with increasing numbers of Bosniacs, 
Croats, and Serbs having become dis-
enchanted with their lives. The Bosnian 
Spring began peaceful but became vio-
lent, with government buildings in Tuzla 
and Zenica, and the presidency building 
in Sarajevo going up in flames (Conces 
2014). They had reached a breaking point 
and were fed up with the country’s high 
unemployment (almost 45 percent), en-
demic poverty, corrupt and ineffective 
governance, and the international over-
seers who perpetuate Bosnia’s “protec-
torate” status. Who could blame them 
for being incensed with the multitude of 
elected officials and functionaries who 
failed to govern but who nevertheless en-
joyed the benefits of a privileged position. 
Since then, much of the activity of the 
protestors has been channeled into orga-
nizing plena—places where people gather 
to formulate their demands for change. 
But the plena seem to have lost their 
momentum, while the imprint of eth-
nic nationalism and the IC’s influence 
remain steadfast in the Balkans. On the 
one hand, those with nationalist lean-
ings see the strong interventionism by 
the IC as incursions that weaken their 
self-determination and undermine their 
ethnic identity, a portrayal that casts the 
IC’s democracy building efforts in a less 
than favorable light. On the other hand, 
the IC views the meddling of national-
ists as an attempt to undermine Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) which 
established the mandate of the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) to ensure peace 
and normalcy within Kosovo, as well as 
regional stability, and those formal agree-
ments and institutions of democracy buil-
ding in Bosnia, particularly the DPA. Re-
gardless of whether the various parties 
accept responsibility for these incursions 
and meddlings, continuous tension be-
tween ethnic nationalists themselves, and 
between them and the cosmopolitan in-
terventionists, has created an opening for 
the hyperintellectual as a transformative 
agent between these apparent rivals. As 
this essay will make clear, it is the hyper-
intellectual, who through a reciprocating 
critique and defense of the nationalist en-
terprises and strong interventionism and 
the rest, strives to create a climate of un-
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derstanding and an enlargement of mor-
al space so as to reduce the divisiveness 
between opponents. Tackling the issue of 
moral space is of the utmost importance 
because the chauvinistic morality of the 
nationalist shrinks or collapses the space 
within which people navigate in respect-
ful ways. Enlarging it is achieved in ways 
that reflect an inflationary model of mo-
rality, one that finds empathy (and hospi-
tality) to be more important than the sim-
ple permissiveness of tolerance or, worse 
yet, “disengaged toleration,” which is to 
say that “you are right in your community 
and I am right in mine” (Sen 2009: x). But 
this enlargement process is not simply 
the creation of a willingness to interact in 
close proximity, for it is dependent upon 
the ease with which people are able to be 
in close proximity with one another. It is 
when the environment becomes enriched 
in ways that create proximity that the hy-
perintellectual becomes more of a catalyst 
for a democratic culture within the civil 
societies of Kosovo and Bosnia.
The remainder of this essay is orga-
nized in the following way. In Part I, I 
provide an elaboration of the hyperintel-
lectual, one that distinguishes the hyper-
intellectual from the hypointellectual by 
means of a thorough examination of the 
“fifth” characteristic of non-partisanship. 
Part II offers a definition of civil society 
and shows that the hyperintellectual can 
serve as a catalyst for democratization 
within civil society by creating a climate 
of understanding that reduces the divi-
siveness between opposing parties. Part 
III offers a discussion of the inflationary 
model of morality, a model that exposes 
another way in which the hyperintellec-
tual can be a transformative agent for de-
mocratization, this time by enlarging the 
moral space of rivals. By reflecting on the 
nature of moral space, with a focus on its 
obstacles as well as remedies, I will show 
the importance of hospitality, particularly 
as it pertains to the enlargement of moral 
space. Part IV acknowledges the bounded 
effectiveness of the hyperintellectual.  
 
Elaborating on the Hyperintellectual
The terms ‘intellectual’ in the late-19th 
century and ‘public intellectual’ in the 
20th century were coined in an attempt 
to label a sort of person who was already 
present in the world. On the one hand, 
it referred to someone providing a public 
defense even at great risk to themselves. 
On the other hand, it pointed to some-
one who was engaged in a public debate 
about important concerns and who was 
not beholden to the state, the university, 
or the media. The 21st century coinage of 
‘hyperintellectual’ and ‘hypointellectual’, 
however, is not simply about labeling, but 
about taxonomy, hence the earlier refer-
ence to the hyper and hypo species of the 
genus Publicus intellectualis. This taxono-
my of intellectuals is both descriptive and 
normative. It is descriptive insofar as hav-
ing defined the hypointellectual in terms 
of a broad range of varied magnitudes 
of four common attributes and looking 
around the world, we find things which 
answer to this definition. In fact, the hy-
pointellectual is the most prevalent of in-
tellectuals. The project is also normative 
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insofar as this run–of-the-mill intellec-
tual is juxtaposed to an intellectual that 
we should want to inhabit societies—the 
hyperintellectual, a highly endowed hy-
pointellectual who is also a non-partisan. 
Stipulating this definition to the word 
‘hyperintellectual’ and valuing the pres-
ence of a non-partisan intellectual is one 
thing, whether there are intellectuals in 
the world which answer to this definition 
is a matter for another essay. For now it 
is enough to lay out in further detail the 
characteristics of which the hyperintel-
lectual is a composite. The distinguishing 
attribute of non-partisanship will require 
a more thorough examination than the 
others simply because of the objections 
that many have launched against its very 
possibility. 
A Menagerie of Characteristics…
The first characteristic—that of the so-
cial critic—is alluded to by Edward Said 
in his Representations of the Intellectual 
(1996). “The public role of the intellec-
tual,” declares Said, is “as outsider, ‘am-
ateur,’ and disturber of the status quo” 
(1996: x). For Said, being an “insider,” an 
“expert,” a “professional” leads one to be-
come more concerned with serving power 
and promoting special interests and one’s 
career than with speaking the truth, for 
speaking the truth requires a readiness 
to disturb the status quo. In effect, the 
intellectual tends to be an oppositional 
figure, one whose consciousness is guided 
by dissent rather than accommodation. 
By disturbing the status quo, the intel-
lectual breaks down inherited ways of 
viewing the world, those stereotypes and 
categories that often hamper our deal-
ings with others. The intellectual strives 
to move beyond the easy or the familiar, 
to the point of “defamiliarizing” the ob-
vious (Amsterdam and Bruner 2000: 23). 
It is the responsibility of the intellectu-
al, declares Said, to “question patriotic 
nationalism, corporate thinking, and a 
sense of class, racial or gender privilege” 
(1996: xiii).6 The intellectual thus offers 
the public a message that confronts or-
thodoxy and represents those segments 
of the population that are often forgotten 
by those who dominate society. Michel 
Foucault iterates this characteristic when 
he writes that the role of the intellectual 
is “to question over and over again what is 
postulated as self-evident, to disturb peo-
ple’s mental habits, the way they do and 
think things, to dissipate what is familiar 
and accepted, to reexamine rules and in-
stitutions” (1988: 265). For Said, then, the 
creation of a disturbance simply reflects 
the intellectual’s “oppositionality” (2004: 
135) or homelessness.7 It is, as Said sees 
it, not so much a matter of leaving one’s 
physical home than it is being an exile in 
6 This includes the actions of the whistleblow-
er, actions that provoke a public debate, such 
as those of Edward Snowden, to the dismay 
of the U.S. intelligence community.
7 Posner (2003: 31) introduces this distinction 
between oppositionality and opposition. An 
important element of the former is a sense of 
moral “homelessness,” something that Theo-
dor Adorno refers to when he writes: “It is 
a part of morality not to be at home in one’s 
home” (1974: 39). I take oppositionality to be 
indicative of a willingness or an urge to search 
for that which is morally reasonable. 
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the sense of being skeptical and critical of 
the received opinion of one’s own com-
munity.
However, the disturbance created by 
the intellectual is not a matter of oppos-
ing one dogma with another, of replacing 
one ideology with another. And this in-
cludes becoming enamored with the ide-
ology of the weak and the downtrodden 
in the name of dissent or resistance to the 
brutality of imperial power and military 
occupation—that is, the straightjacket 
of critique. Again, Said is a case in point. 
As the political scientist Joseph Massad 
perceptively notes, being a “secular critic” 
played a central role in Said’s intellectual 
life: “He insisted on being politically god-
less in an age dominated by the worship 
of political deities—the ‘West,’ Soviet 
Communism, U.S. imperialism, nation-
alisms of all varieties, to name the most 
prominent” (Massad 2010: 23). And, in 
some ways, it meant things Palestinian 
as well: “I take criticism so seriously as 
to believe that, even in the very midst of 
battle in which one is unmistakably on 
one side against another, there should 
be criticism, because there must be crit-
ical consciousness if there are to be is-
sues, problems, values, even lives to be 
fought for” (Said 1983: 28). This helps us 
to understand his public criticism of the 
Palestinian leadership and many Palesti-
nian intellectuals surrounding the Oslo 
Accords of 1993-95. Said’s commitment 
to justice and Palestinian rights and 
self-determination branded the Accords 
as an accommodation to power, marking 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) as participants in a one act play with 
Israel as its stage director. As far as Said 
was concerned, “Capitulation!” was in its 
tenth season when he died of leukemia in 
2003 (Massad 2010: 24).8
The intellectuals’ homelessness, which 
we find instantiated in the likes of Said, is 
to be expected, given (1) that even moral 
judgments in favor of the dispossessed are 
often, if not always, predicated to some 
extent on speaking to the truth of empiri-
cal claims9 and (2) that no individual (or 
group) has a strangle hold on the truth. 
In regard to this latter claim, perhaps the 
British philosopher J. S. Mill had it right 
in his essay On Liberty when he wrote of 
one of the advantages to a diversity of 
opinion: since the “general or prevailing 
opinion on any subject is rarely or never 
the whole truth, it is only by the collision 
of adverse opinions that the remainder of 
the truth has any chance of being sup-
plied” (1962: 180). Or, through another 
lens, the adverse opinion (of the weak and 
the downtrodden), is rarely or never the 
8 For a glimpse of the full force of Said’s cri-
tique of Arafat and the PLO, see Said (1996a) 
and (2005). A fine example of the depth of 
Said’s criticism is the following: “Arafat is fin-
ished: why don’t we admit that he can neither 
lead, nor plan, nor do anything that makes 
any difference except to him and his Oslo cro-
nies who have benefited materially from their 
people’s misery? He is the main obstacle to 
our people’s future” (Said 2004: 96).
9 Saree Makdisi (2008) notes that following 
the Oslo Accords of 1993-95, “Said found 
himself battling not only the injustice of Is-
rael’s policies and the historical injustice of 
Zionism itself but also the corruption, igno-
rance, and poor judgment of the Palestinian 
leadership” (57).
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whole truth on any subject so that a colli-
sion with the prevailing opinion is needed 
for a more robust speaking to the truth. 
This means the opinions and practices of the 
weak and downtrodden sometimes yield to 
fact and argument, an outcome that the 
hyperintellectual is ready to acknowledge.
The synthesis of the hyperintellectual 
continues with the second characteristic 
alluded to by Paul Ricoeur. For him, the 
intellectual is someone who is a political 
educator, an individual committed to mo-
tivating people through “good counsel” to 
become responsible citizens who can work 
and live together within a framework of a 
democratic economy (1974, 1986, 1992). 
I suggest that good counsel is more about 
creating people through an acculturation 
process than it is about simply motivating 
people to behave in certain ways. More 
precisely, good counsel can promote “re-
sponsible citizens” through building cer-
tain kinds of epistemic and political cul-
tures.
The process of making responsible ci-
tizens can be understood epistemically 
insofar as the hyperintellectual qua edu-
cator functions as a role model, setting an 
epistemic standard for others to adopt. In 
short, the counsel strives to create good 
epistemic agents, that is, “persons who 
believe propositions because they have 
epistemic reasons (which increase the 
probability that one’s beliefs are true)...” 
(Conces 2009: 24). Just as important, 
however, is that the hyperintellectual ac-
quires these reasons through no small 
effort of their own. In a way, this effort 
reflects what Kant had in mind when he 
broached the subject of enlightenment.
Enlightenment is man’s release from 
his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is 
man’s inability to make use of his un-
derstanding without direction from 
another. Self-incurred is this tutelage 
when its cause lies not in lack of rea-
son but in lack of resolution and cour-
age [laziness and cowardice] to use it 
without direction from another. Sapere 
aude! “Have courage to use your own 
reason!”—that is the motto of enlight-
enment (1986: 263). 
So the hyperintellectual is intellectu-
ally autonomous, rather than conformist; 
someone who is not reliant on another 
for the “direction and control of...[their] 
thinking” (Paul and Elder 2002: 32).10
Such agents not only take epistemic 
reasons and autonomy seriously, but they 
possess commonplace self-restraints on 
reasoning. These restraints include the var-
ious regulative ideals or epistemic goods 
such as understanding, intelligibility, 
and trustworthiness; and the intellectual 
virtues such as humility (vs. arrogance), 
empathy (vs. narrow-mindedness), and 
integrity (vs. hypocrisy). In addition, the 
good epistemic agent acknowledges “the 
10 To speak of intellectual autonomy in this 
way does not require us to decide whether the 
hyperintellectual is either an extreme or weak 
epistemic egoist as defined by Zagzebski 
(2009: 88), for these two forms of epistemic 
egoism include the agent either demand-
ing proof of p that can be determined by the 
agent’s own faculties or evidence that the 
other person who is providing the evidence is 
trustworthy, respectively. In short, “both kinds 
of egoist think that the fact that someone else 
has a certain belief is never as such a reason for 
them to believe it” (88).
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moral obligation to care about true belief 
itself ” (Conces 2009: 23; Zagzebski 2009: 
9-19).
Interesting enough, epistemic con-
cerns have been clearly recognized by a 
number of economists, including Adam 
Smith’s introduction of the impartial 
spectator (1976), Gunnar Myrdal’s dis-
cussion of objectivity and bias (1969), 
Amartya Sen’s treatment of impartiality, 
and Thomas Piketty’s casting of the role 
of intellectuals, including social scientists 
(2014). At the start of his massive Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Pike-
tty succinctly notes that the role of in-
tellectuals, including social scientists, is 
to “redefine the terms of debate, unmask 
certain preconceived or fraudulent no-
tions, and subject all positions to constant 
critical scrutiny” (3). Surely, what Piketty 
and the rest have in mind in some form or 
another is good epistemic agency!
Understanding responsible citizen-
ship in epistemic terms makes the social 
critic and the educator supportive of one 
another because truth is at the heart of 
both roles. It is no wonder that the hy-
perintellectual does not take these roles 
to the extreme. On the one hand, the hy-
perintellectual qua critic does not engage 
in fanatical dissent, which is blind, inces-
sant critique of the Other. Such dissent is 
the hallmark of those who are intolerant, 
self-righteous, overly certain, and zealous. 
The hyperintellectual is less vulnerable to 
such dissent because the sort of weak rea-
soning and suspension of commonplace 
self-restraints on reasoning are contrary 
to the hyperintellectual being a good 
epistemic agent. On the other hand, the 
hyperintellectual qua educator does not 
acquiesce to power. Such acquiescence 
would mean a transformation of the role 
of the intellectual to “one of closing de-
bate, not opening it; of serving power, 
not challenging it; of humoring authority, 
not speaking truth to it” (Massad 2010: 
42)—that is, becoming a mouthpiece of 
the decisions, policies, and vision of those 
in power. It is precisely because the hy-
perintellectual is a good epistemic agent 
that the commonplace self-restraints on 
reasoning are not significantly reduced or 
abandoned, allowing the hyperintellectu-
al to educate with truth to power (and to 
lack of power). Criticality is not replaced 
by loyal obedience. Of course, the intellec-
tual as a good epistemic agent could find 
some state policies justifiable, especially if 
the state is not criminally totalitarian or 
outright fascist. Educating others about 
the legitimacy or efficacy of state policy, 
for example, need not amount to “cutting 
a deal” to make life easier for the intel-
lectual.11 But exhibiting acceptable epis-
temic agency does require a heightened 
sense of scrutiny of policies that are the 
products of state, corporate, or other in-
stitutions of power. Some believe that a 
balance must be struck between the two 
extremes. Laying out this balance, Said 
writes, that
the intellectual ought neither to be so 
uncontroversial and safe a figure as to 
be just a friendly technician nor should 
the intellectual try to be a full-time 
11 For a discussion of fanatical reasoning, see 
Conces (2009: 34-36).
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deliberation produces less partisanship, 
enhances sympathy with the plight of 
others, and increases commitment and 
consensus building. It does so by placing 
more value on evidence-based reasoning, 
agreeing that reasons need to be public 
and understandable, and being open to 
the possibility of changing one’s mind. 
These are the hallmarks of non-fanatical 
reasoning.
Good counsel can also promote re-
sponsible citizens through the creation 
and maintenance of specific types of po-
litical culture, including, though not lim-
ited to, one that is supportive of a liberal 
democracy. Such a culture fosters moral 
content that falls under the general head-
ing of liberty, equality, justice, and frater-
nity. And it is replete with the specifics 
of individual rights; equal opportunities; 
equal respect for persons; equal liberties 
of speech, association, and conscience; 
and the rest. So the hyperintellectual can 
give good counsel through the integra-
tion of such content in his or her analyses 
and judgments.
Political culture is far more expan-
sive, however. The American philosopher 
Martha C. Nussbaum claims in her book 
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for 
Justice, “all political principles, the good 
as well as the bad, need emotional sup-
port to ensure their stability over time, 
and all decent societies need to guard 
public sphere, complete with a lived intercon-
nectivity; maybe it is more like a donut, one 
on which being good epistemic agents living 
and working together is simply not feasible. 
But surely the donut can be traded in for a 
sphere, for it is simply an engineering prob-
lem. 
Cassandra, who was not only righ-
teously unpleasant but also unheard....
But the alternatives are not total qui-
escence or total rebelliousness (1996: 
69).
But what is the relevant level of de-
scription for explaining the actions of an 
intellectual? Is it, as Said believes, on the 
level of a “friendly technician” and a “full-
time Cassandra,” in which case he believes 
there must be a balance, or is it on the lev-
el of good epistemic agency developed as 
a social critic and educator, in which case 
there is no need for a balance but is sim-
ply a matter of resisting extremes. What 
is at stake is far more nuanced than Said’s 
passages indicate.
But promoting this agency is also in-
tegral to creating responsible citizens who 
can “live and work together,” for surely 
the good epistemic agent, more than the 
fanatic, is likely to be someone who is 
able to meaningfully interact and become 
deeply interdependent with a diverse 
group of others, especially in delibera-
tive democracies that do not simply have 
legitimacy based on the aggregation of 
preferences through voting but rather as 
a result of authentic deliberation.12 Such 
12 Some may say that much of what I offer is 
not very applicable to present-day Palestine 
and that Said was right after all: “Better dis-
parity and dislocation than reconciliation un-
der duress of subject and object; better a lucid 
exile than sloppy, sentimental homecomings; 
better the logic of dissociation than an as-
sembly of compliant dunces” (Said 2000: 17). 
Yet creating a citizenry and a community is a 
work in progress. Perhaps Palestinian and Is-
raeli Jew do not live on the surface of a shared 
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against division and hierarchy by culti-
vating appropriate sentiments of sympa-
thy and love” (2013: 2-3). Not only must 
the moral content win the minds of citi-
zens, but their hearts must be won over 
by strong emotions which support that 
content. Being a proponent of a liberal 
society herself, Nussbaum contends that 
the political cultivation of emotions has 
two distinct tasks: (1) to bolster strong 
commitment for national goals, projects, 
and visions that are beyond the narrow 
agendas of the personal and that “require 
effort and sacrifice” and (2) to reduce the 
harmful “tendencies to protect the frag-
ile self by denigrating and subordinating 
others,” especially when group identity 
is involved (2013: 3).13 She argues that 
love is fundamental for a decent society 
because the emotions that sustain such a 
society are rooted in love. One emotion 
that is particularly important for this 
work is compassion and its connection 
with empathy. It is at the core of the infla-
tionary model of morality, which is part 
of a framework for situating the hyper-
intellectual in modern-day civil society 
building and democratization, as well as a 
catalyst for the creation and maintenance 
of a democratic culture.
But nothing in the rendering of the 
political educator as one who gives good 
counsel through the creation and main-
tenance of epistemical and political cul-
tures indicates that this role is contrary to 
that of the social critic. Nothing that has 
been stated so far about good epistemic 
13 I have addressed this concern with the xe-
nophobia and chauvinism of ethnic national-
ism in Conces (2005, 2002).
agents, epistemical and political cultures, 
and emotions indicates that a judgment 
by the hyperintellectual in favor of the 
state or an international organization ad-
ministering a territory would be evidence 
that the hyperintellectual is simply an ac-
complice of that ruling hegemony. On 
the contrary, the judgment could simply 
comport with the fifth characteristic of 
the hyperintellectual—non-partisanship
—which creates the possibility to challe-
nge what some take to be a self-evident 
wrong perpetrated by the state or some 
other powerful entity. Consequently, the 
hyperintellectual does not become a part 
of the “dialogue of the deaf,” subservient 
to either side’s “vision of history” and 
claims of being misunderstood, manip-
ulated, or exploited (see Dragović-Soso 
2002: 130-131).
The third characteristic, that of the 
person of action, lies at the heart of a 
shift that eventually dominated Jean-
Paul Sartre’s thinking on the intellectual, 
a move away from his initial portrayal of 
the intellectual as the committed writer 
(one who dwells in the realm of thought) 
to that of the revolutionary or militant 
(one who dwells in the realm of action), a 
move that was made final during the late 
1960s. Douglas Kellner’s insightful un-
published paper (1975) on the trajectory 
of the Sartrean intellectual is most useful 
in this regard.14
14 One of the best exposes of the shift in Sar-
tre’s thinking on the intellectual can be found 
in Douglas Kellner’s unpublished paper “In-
tellectuals and Revolution: A Study of the 
Philosophical-Political Trajectory of Jean-
Paul Sartre” (1975).  
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Kellner, in surveying Sartre’s writings 
on the intellectual, takes Sartre’s writ-
ings immediately following World War 
II and into the 1950s as portraying what 
he refers to as the “classical intellectual.” 
Early on, beginning with a series of es-
says in What is Literature? (1947), Sartre 
focused on the intellectual as writer, one 
who commits literature to the expansion 
of freedom (Kellner 1975: 5). As France 
became more embroiled in the Algerian 
problem, Sartre’s rendering of the intel-
lectual was increasingly framed within 
the colonial experience and the function 
of the intellectual took on an increasing-
ly moralistic tone, albeit not limited to 
denouncing the injustices in Algeria. As 
Kellner notes, “the sphere and arena of 
the intellectual [for Sartre] is the word: 
writing and talking. The function of the 
intellectual is critical and negative: to 
describe and denounce” (10). The 1950s 
also saw Sartre take a Marxist turn in his 
philosophy while certain events within 
the political realm (the Soviet invasion 
of Hungary in 1956) led to his distancing 
himself from the USSR and the French 
Communist Party. The classical concep-
tion of the intellectual continued to hold 
sway for Sartre, but this was to end in the 
1960s.
Kellner notes that Sartre’s conception 
of the intellectual began to change start-
ing with a lecture series that Sartre deliv-
ered during a visit to Japan in September-
October 1966 which were subsequent-
ly published under the title “A Plea for 
Intellectuals” (1974). At the heart of 
this new conception is a contradiction 
that emerges in the life of intellectuals 
within a class society. On the one hand, 
the intellectual is a technician who pro-
duces practical knowledge through the 
search for universal truth for the good 
of all. However, this technician becomes 
subservient to the interests of dominant 
ideologies, groups, and institutions with-
in a class society. Thus, “a contradiction 
emerges between the universality of in-
tellectual labor…and the particularity of 
the interests served” (17). The intellectual 
realizes this contradiction and becomes 
cognizant of functioning as a tool for the 
ruling class. With the recognition of fur-
ther contradictions, the intellectual be-
comes rebellious and, being seen as such 
by the authorities, draws their attention 
in order to bring him or her back into the 
fold. The intellectual has two ways to re-
spond to the ruling class: conform to it 
or refuse to be its agent. It is the latter 
response, which amounts to trying to re-
solve these contradictions, that leads to 
the genuine intellectual. However, this re-
quires the intellectual to “leave the realm 
of ideas and see that social change can 
only come through mass action and that 
they themselves must work on the level of 
action and events (and not merely ideas)” 
(22). In other words, the genuine intellec-
tual investigates the personal and social in 
order to bring about change. But if there 
is to be change, such as the elimination of 
discrimination, the intellectual must not 
only modify his or her thinking and the 
thinking of others by offering convincing 
arguments, but must also modify his or 
her sensibility, for discrimination is also 
an attitude comprised of a cognitive, af-
fective, and action triad (Sartre 1974: 
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249). However, these modifications alone 
are not sufficient to eradicate this prob-
lem because the intellectual’s most valu-
able work in challenging a problem like 
discrimination occurs on a far different, 
though not wholly unrelated, level. Since 
discrimination is not simply an idea, but 
an idea that is actualized in events that 
are dated and localized, the intellectual 
must produce concrete events that serve 
to reject discrimination at the level of 
events (1974: 251). The intellectual needs 
“to join [an action]..., to...participate in it 
physically...” (1974: 261). The intellectual 
must be engaged; hence, the intellectual 
is a “person of action”; and, since he or 
she is battling the ideas and culture of the 
ruling class, the intellectual is also a revo-
lutionary or a militant in the name of the 
oppressed. This new revolutionary was 
the end point of the trajectory of Sartre’s 
thinking about the intellectual which 
found its most concise expression in a 
1971 interview with the political scientist 
John Garassi. For Sartre, “the intellectual 
who does all his fighting from an office 
is counterrevolutionary today, no matter 
what he writes” and that “the intellectu-
al who does not put his body as well as 
his mind on the line against the system is 
fundamentally supporting the system—
and should be judged accordingly” (Sartre 
1971: 117-118).
While in general I agree with Sartre 
that the intellectual often needs to act 
in ways that are much more risky than 
wielding a pen or pounding a keyboard, I 
do not agree with him that the intellectu-
al per se must be a revolutionary and that 
as a revolutionary he or she must also act 
in this more expansive way as contrast-
ed with the counterrevolutionary, who 
apparently remains indoors at a writing 
table or computer and, thus, impotent to 
combat the system.15 Although this dis-
course makes sense in regard to the hy-
pointellectual, it is not applicable to the 
hyperintellectual. Indeed, my contention 
about the epistemic foundation of the hy-
perintellectual does not support acts that 
are rigidly revolutionary or militant, or, to 
put it in slightly different terms, as always 
siding with the least favored and most 
oppressed of society, and always in a more 
risky sort of way. Acts can include writing 
or picketing that are not revolutionary 
in nature, but rather reactionary, statist, 
or simply supportive of the structures of 
power and authority that only occasion-
ally oppress. Sartre’s casting the genuine 
intellectual as someone engaged in the 
fight against the system is overshadowed 
by the hyperintellectual’s epistemic char-
acter. What is foundational for hyperin-
tellectualism is that it is epistemically im-
provisational; there is no ideological script 
for actions to adhere to, no ideological 
patron to satisfy. Being improvisational 
amounts to being a non-partisan, which 
is the fifth characteristic of the hyperin-
tellectual. The hyperintellectual is not in 
lock step with or against the influence of 
the powers that be, whether those powers 
refer to the state, corporations, or parties. 
Such loyalty, the requirement that a per-
15 It appears that Sartre was of the view that 
not to engage in action only enhances the 
possibility that any revolutionary gains will 
be lost, thereby justifying the label “counter-
revolutionary.”
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son is in favor of this side or that side, for 
the left or the right, is what is indicative 
of the hypointellectual rather than the hy-
perintellectual. Even though there being 
no privileging of either the revolutionary 
or the reactionary as always being a good 
moral agent, there is the possibility that 
both the revolutionary and the unrevolu-
tionary are intermittently good epistemic 
agents. That is to say, they can both be 
occasionally good moral and epistemic 
agents; neither one being absolutely good 
(or, absolutely bad) in either way. And as 
far as action goes, what is important is the 
breadth of actions that are incorporated 
into the regiment of the hyperintellectual. 
Even though the power of ideas is formi-
dable, that “all human actions are carried 
out and find their meaning and signifi-
cance in a cultural ambience of ideas...” 
(Callicott 1995: 35), the battle against in-
justice or the defense of truth may require 
not only putting “pen to paper,” but also 
standing in a picket line for either those 
who claim little power and who feel that 
their needs are not being met or those 
who are in power (perhaps even the state) 
because such participation is itself a con-
crete event in the public domain that is 
recordable and which sends a message.
The fourth characteristic is insider-
ism. Although being an insider may seem 
contrary to the social critic as an outsid-
er, Michael Walzer, best known for his 
Spheres of Justice, makes it clear that this 
need not be so. In a more recent book 
The Company of Critics: Social Criticism 
and Political Commitment in the Twentieth 
Century, Walzer refers to the critic as an 
insider insofar as the person exhibits a 
certain mindfulness and commitment to 
the society in question. The critic is one 
“who care[s] about what happens to it 
[the society]” (2002: xi). To take a criti-
cal stand and a caring attitude toward a 
society, however, does not mean that the 
critic must meet the demand for objec-
tivity through a “radical detachment, ab-
solute impartiality, or a God’s eye view of 
the world...” (2002: xii). On the contrary, 
the critic must be “engaged” in the society, 
and this engagement comes only from 
one’s own subjective situation. As Franz 
Rosenzweig makes us clearly aware,
the single condition imposed upon us 
by objectivity is that we survey the en-
tire horizon; but we are not obliged 
to make this survey from any position 
other than the one in which we are, nor 
are we obliged to make it from no po-
sition at all. Our eyes are, indeed, only 
our own eyes; yet it would be folly to 
imagine that we must pluck them out 
in order to see straight (1961: 179).16
Although this engagement does not 
require the critic to reside within the soci-
ety in question (one can be a critic in exile 
or an expatriate critic), it does require a 
certain degree of knowledge about that 
society. There are many different perspec-
tives and sets of experiences from which 
intellectuals voice their criticism. But the 
“good” social critic (though not necessar-
ily the successful one) is not just someone 
16 I am struck by how similar this is to Geertz 
(1986), when he states “we cannot live other 
people’s lives, and it is a piece of bad faith to 
try” (373).
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who is empirically informed. The intellec-
tual is someone, declares Walzer, to whom 
we need to listen, who “touch[es] our 
moral nerves…and force[s] us to look at 
what we would rather avoid, the wrong-
ness in our own society, in our own lives” 
(2002: xiii). The intellectual is in posses-
sion of the moral virtues of courage, com-
passion, and a good eye (2002: xiv-xvii). 
Moral courage is important because it 
involves the ability to continue criticism 
when one’s fellow citizens (even friends) 
are silent or complicit. The hyperintel-
lectual practices a form of radical forth-
rightness. Compassion also has its place 
because knowledge of human suffering 
is crucial for appropriate criticism.17 And 
a good eye is valuable because the critic 
must be open to the world in order to be 
honest about the presence of oppression, 
exploitation, and injustice.
Plus Q-ness: 
Being a Non-Partisan is a Bitch 
So far the characteristics or threads that 
define the diverse set of hypointellectuals 
and that serve to define in large measure 
the hyperintellectual have been laid out in 
such a way that it may give the impres-
sion that moving from the most minimal 
type of intellectual to the most severe 
17 “Compassion [is] …a state of mind that is 
nonviolent, nonharming, and nonaggressive. 
It is a mental attitude based on the wish for 
others to be free of their suffering and is as-
sociated with a sense of commitment, respon-
sibility, and respect towards the other” (The 
Dalai Lama and Cutler 1998: 114).
hypointellectual (one whose character-
istics are accentuated) to the hyperintel-
lectual comes with relative ease. However, 
any hypointellectual who desires to turn 
“hyper” faces a set of difficult challenges, 
a sort of Scylla and Charybdis that will 
serve to deter many an intellectual.
On one side of the narrow straight is 
Scylla, the many-headed monster, who is 
ready to manhandle all those who stray 
too close. Scylla, in this argument, are de-
ficiencies associated with each of the four 
characteristics—critical insider, political 
educator, person of action, and caring in-
sider. On the other side of the straight, 
however, is Charybdis, a whirlpool that 
destroys those ships that cannot escape 
it. In the present argument, Charybdis 
is the danger of partisanship or bias that 
gives the other characteristics a distinct 
ideological aura, leading the intellectual 
to take sides whenever the occasion aris-
es. It is in this sense that the intellectual 
has an ideological patron. The resulting 
disturbance leads to one ideology replac-
ing another; an epistemical and political 
culture limiting who can live and work 
together, as well as how liberal a society 
can become, the abandonment of any 
desire to solve the contradictions in fa-
vor of becoming a “hired hand” for those 
who rule or command; and a caring for 
some within society and not others. It is, 
in short, the entrenched exclusivity that 
exists today. Not only must the hyper-
intellectual significantly possess all four 
characteristics of the hypointellectual, he 
or she must possess a certain degree of 
quirkiness (q-ness) vis-á-vis the fifth char-
acteristic, non-partisanship, the one char-
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acteristic that acts as a “glue” (possibly 
vaccination) for the rest and that results 
in an amalgam (possibly health). This is 
the final and most important piece of the 
elaboration of the hyperintellectual.
In exploring the meaning of non-par-
tisanship, it is best to first discuss how it 
differs from impartiality, which has come 
under heavy criticism. Examining both 
Iris Marion Young’s 1990 Justice and the 
Politics of Difference—a postmodernist cri-
tique of impartiality, and Marilyn Fried-
man’s 1989 “The Impracticality of Im-
partiality”—an article that is both critical 
and revisionary, is helpful in this regard.18
Both Young and Friedman remind us 
that impartiality has been treated as an 
18 Friedman, more so than Young, alerts us 
to the diversity of terms used to refer to an 
“unbiased normative standpoint.” Terms like 
‘bias’, which is “the unduly favoring of one 
party, person or group of persons when dis-
putes arise or interests compete,” and ‘preju-
dice’, which “a judgment formed prior to due 
consideration” are often used interchangeably 
with ‘impartiality’. Friedman combines them 
in referring to the sort of “favoritism that is 
not based on due consideration, or supported 
by good reasons” (1989: 646-647). I will use 
the term ‘impartiality’ though the other two 
terms will surface later in my discussion of 
this topic. It should also be noted that Young’s 
postmodernist critique, that highlights the 
discarding of difference for unity, draws heav-
ily from Stephen Darwall (1983) and Thomas 
Nagel (1986) for her discussion of impartiali-
ty found in chapter four entitled “The Ideal of 
Impartiality and the Civic Public.” Friedman’s 
refers to Darwall and Nagel as well, though it 
is more of a conceptual analysis that focuses 
on the weaknesses of two theoretical models 
of impartial moral thinking—the methods 
of universalization and models of social con-
tract—but closes out the article with a recom-
mendation for dealing with bias.
ideal throughout much of modern ethical 
theory. The “unbiased standpoint” has even 
seeped into everyday moral thinking as 
the “privileged standpoint for critically re-
flecting on normative matters” (Friedman 
1989: 645). Yet impartiality is destined to 
controversy; Young views it as being ex-
tremely problematic, while Friedman finds 
impartiality to be elusive.
According to Young, the ideal of im-
partiality arises in its association with a 
paradigm of moral reasoning that situates 
the reasoner within a moral point of view 
that is both universal and objective (99). 
The process by which the theorist or the 
agent arrives at this point of view is “by 
abstracting from all the particularities of 
the circumstances on which moral reason 
reflects” (100). It is an attempt to reduce 
plurality to unity, denying or repressing 
difference, through a threefold abstrac-
tion leading the impartial reasoner to be 
detached, dispassionate, and a universal 
reasoning subject. The impartial reason-
er denies the experiential and historical 
particularities of a situation, allowing for 
the treatment of situations from the same 
moral principles. The impartial reasoner 
abstracts from feelings and interests that 
he or she may have in regard to the situa-
tion. Also, the impartial reasoner abstracts 
from the partiality of affiliation that is 
part of what constitutes concrete subjects, 
leading to a point of view that any and 
all rational agents can adopt (100). The 
result of these abstractions is a point of 
view that is devoid of concreteness; it is a 
“transcendental ‘view from nowhere’.”
But Young is keen on showing the 
problems of impartiality. First, particular-
ity will always be in operation regardless 
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of abstraction since the abstraction pro-
cess generates a dichotomy or an opposi-
tion between the impartial and universal 
aspects of a moral context and those that 
are partial and particular. In addition, 
there is a dichotomy between reason and 
feelings. Although reason is defined in a 
way that calls for their expulsion, feelings 
and interests simply do not go away. They 
are an ever present source of motivation. 
Thus, partiality and impartiality are two 
sides of the same coin (97, 103). Second, 
impartiality is an impossible ideal because 
moral reasoning cannot (and should not) 
purge particularities of context and affilia-
tion. As far as Young is concerned, the ide-
al of impartiality is a fiction: “No one can 
adopt a point of view that is completely 
impersonal and dispassionate, completely 
separated from any particular context and 
commitments” (103). And, since all view-
points are “situated,” they cannot be uni-
versal. They are all entrenched in particu-
larity. Third, impartiality has an ideologi-
cal function (that is, supportive of domi-
nation and oppression) insofar as it masks 
the ways in which dominant groups claim 
universality of their own perspectives and 
justify hierarchical decision making (97).
But the ideals of impartiality and non-
partisanship are not one and the same. 
Whereas impartiality is a so-called tran-
scendental view, a move away from the 
moral agency of concrete human beings in 
a world of particularity, non-partisanship 
is an acceptance of the concreteness of our 
being and the particularity of the world 
that we live in, a full acknowledgment 
of our perspectivism while disallowing 
one or more perspectives from exhibit-
ing some form of favoritism, whether it 
be analytically differentiated as a bias or a 
prejudice.19 Favoritism amounts to parti-
sanship, an attitude that leads a person to 
naturally take a side in a conflict from the 
very start. Moreover, he or she will view 
problem after problem, issue after issue, 
in the way that any other socialist, or lib-
eral, or conservative would view problems 
and issues.20 So this is what it means to be 
a partisan, to be attached to a particular 
ideology or group affiliation and an asso-
ciated cluster of perspectives that biases 
judgments one way or another. Being so 
attached also means that one can be iden-
tified, whether it is a matter of self-iden-
tification and/or other-identification, as a 
“socialist” or “liberal” or “conservative” or 
whatever other kind of hypointellectual.
19 A treatment of perspective qua bias is devel-
oped within the writings of Gunnar Myrdal 
(1968, 1969, 1970). In his strongly worded 
attack on the myth of objectivity in research, 
Myrdal points to the important role that our 
biases play in research: “There is a tendency for 
all knowledge, like all ignorance, to deviate from 
truth in an opportunistic direction….A first 
pre-condition when trying to unfetter our 
minds from biases in order to reach a truer 
perception of reality is to see clearly the op-
portunistic interests affecting our search for 
truth and to understand how they operate” 
(1970: 3-4). Myrdal’s point is a valuable one, 
but it is also important to distinguish between 
bias qua favoritism and bias qua perspectiv-
ism.  
20 This echoes Nagel’s work, though Na-
gel takes it back to the fundamental level of 
evidence in his uncovering the lunacy of the 
postmodern, relativist project: “The subordi-
nation of the intellect to partisan loyalty is 
found across the political spectrum, but usu-
ally it takes the form of a blind insistence on 
the objective truth of certain supporting facts 
and refusal to consider evidence to the con-
trary” (2005: 461).
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All but one point of view may survive the 
evaluation process, but that occurs only 
as a result of the process and not due to 
some bias.22
Of course, this view of non-partisan-
ship is not without its difficulties. First, 
there is the mechanism by which a person 
becomes or remains a non-partisan. How 
are perspectives kept at bay from becom-
ing biases or prejudices? In attempting to 
answer this question, however, we face a 
host of practical problems. For instance, 
how do we become cognizant of perspec-
tives as perspectives that bias or preju-
dice our moral thinking about issues and 
problems that we face in life? But enu-
merating our potentially distorting per-
spectives, which are themselves dynamic, 
is not something that we are in the habit 
of doing. Then, again, there is little reason 
to catalog the entirety of one’s perspec-
tives (if possible) at any given time. It is 
enough to simply be mindful of those 
potentially distorting perspectives that 
are relevant for the situation in which we 
currently find ourselves. Even so, this is 
not as easy as one might believe, for as 
Friedman notes, “for good psychological 
reasons, each person’s unaided thinking 
cannot be trusted to discern its own bi-
ases. One’s own thinking—explicit and 
when she contends that the resurrection is 
predicated on the moral reasoner simply be-
ing able to be “sympathetic” with other posi-
tions and points of view. Young, to my dismay, 
fails to distinguish the two paradigms (Young 
1990: 105)     
22 Amartya Sen (2011) gives us pause to re-
think the expectation which many have that 
there must always be one view or argument 
that wins out over all the others.
The non-partisan, on the other hand, 
will evaluate each problem or issue so 
that what is objectionable and defensi-
ble within each opposing camp is given 
voice. The hyperintellectual as non-par-
tisan does not enter into the discussion 
or the debate biased or prejudiced one 
way or another, but open to the possibil-
ity of agreeing with one side or another 
or neither depending on the outcome of 
the analysis. What is important is not 
a particular side, but that the debate is 
kept alive to the very end, which hope-
fully gives rise to the more reasonable 
position. Young herself allows for the 
possibility of the non-partisan given her 
contention that the entrenched particu-
larism of human beings does not mean 
that we are “only self-regarding, unable 
and unwilling to consider other interests 
and points of view” (114). There may be 
nothing like a universal point of view that 
is the same for each and every rational 
agent, a Rawlsian-like original position or 
a Nagelian-like view from nowhere, but 
that does not rule out the possibility that 
an intellectual, for example, will consid-
er “other interests or points of view.” In 
this regard, “to consider” another point of 
view is not the same as “to adopt” another 
point of view. It simply means that they 
are “sympathetic” or open to evaluating 
other points of view without summarily 
accepting or dismissing any one of them.21 
21 The feminist political philosopher Susan 
Okin (1989), in her attempt to resurrect the 
Rawlsian original position as a reasoning pro-
cess that arrives at the best outcome by tak-
ing into account all particular viewpoints in 
society, herself seems to reject the “adoption” 
paradigm in favor of the “sympathy” paradigm 
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implicit, avowed and tacit—is not fully 
transparent to oneself ” (655-656). For 
Friedman, then, it is through the assis-
tance of “interpersonal and public dia-
logue” that biases and prejudices become 
recognizable to us.
But even if we personally and inter-
personally succeed in listing the relevant 
perspectives, there remains a further prac-
tical problem—keeping one’s perspectives 
at bay until “due diligence” is achieved. 
What does it mean to “keep perspectives 
at bay” so that they are “disarmed” of their 
distorting power? Does it simply mean 
saying to oneself, for example, “I will not 
make reference to elements of my social-
ist ideology when working on a particular 
problem”? But would that even make a 
difference? Twisting Freidman just a bit, 
even if ideology or gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity, class background, etc., are re-
ferred to, this does not mean that ideol-
ogy and those other particulars will not 
“influence” the consideration, thus mak-
ing it partial rather than impartial. Surely, 
to simply say it isn’t so does not mean that 
it isn’t so. Freidman with Darwall in mind 
is correct about the crux of the problem 
when she states that “the problem is that 
there is no way to ensure that one’s nor-
mative thinking is not being tacitly af-
fected by one’s own subjective particulars 
or debarred motivations” [regardless of 
them being referred to] (652).23 Indeed, 
the consequences are enormous:
Beliefs about the causes of poverty and 
about society-wide responsibilities to 
23 Friedman focuses on the “unmentioned” 
particularities, but my concern includes those 
that are mentioned.
the poor may well reflect the motive 
force of one’s own class background. 
Beliefs about the legitimacy of subsi-
dized daycare at professional meetings 
may reflect the motive force of one’s 
parental status. One’s degree of toler-
ance for sexual and other sorts of social 
violence may reflect the motive force 
of one’s gender (652-653). 
But even though there is no guarantee 
that our normative thinking will not be 
distorted in the ways mentioned or yet to 
be mentioned, it does not follow that there 
is no method for improving our critical 
moral thinking through uncovering our 
perspectives qua biases. In fact, Friedman 
has suggested one: interpersonal and pub-
lic dialogue. However, I think Friedman 
does not fully appreciate the value of her 
own method, for it is not simply that “the 
beneficiaries, victims, observers, and so 
on, of one’s behavior may be better situ-
ated than oneself to discern biases hidden 
behind one’s articulated moral attitudes, 
because they can comprehend those 
avowals contextually in the light of ones’ 
related actions and practices” (656). What 
is buried by this discussion of the “obser-
vant Other” in this dialogical relationship 
is the very act of “calling us out on it,” of 
shouting at us in no uncertain terms that 
we are biased or prejudiced in this way or 
that way, perhaps not so to the Other who 
shouts but biased or prejudiced to another 
Other who is aware but remains silent or 
who is not even aware of our favoritism.
Second, there is the issue of the 
self-identification and/or other-identifi-
cation of an intellectual. The non-parti-
san is said to take on problems or issues 
72
The Hyperin-
tellectual in 
the Balkans:
Recomposed
Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development
on an individual basis, judging each on its 
own merits. On one day and concerning 
one problem, the hyperintellectual judges 
in such a way that he or she “appears” as 
a liberal to some onlookers. The next day 
and concerning another problem, that 
same hyperintellectual may judge in a way 
that he or she “appears” to be a conserva-
tive to the very same onlookers. But what 
happens if a hyperintellectual just hap-
pens to judge each and every day in a way 
that gives the appearance of a socialist? 
Nothing noted thus far rules out such a 
possibility, albeit slim as it may be. Do we 
then brand that hyperintellectual a social-
ist? If so, then the distinction between the 
socialist as ideologue and the hyperintel-
lectual as socialist may have vanished. If 
this distinction remains viable, then how 
is it to be made? If there are no practical 
guidelines by which these differentiations 
can be made with confidence and accura-
cy, then the efficacy of this conception of 
a non-partisan intellectual is placed into 
question. This, in turn, jeopardizes the 
concept of the hyperintellectual. These 
are vexing issues. Without a solution to 
the twin concerns of non-partisanship 
and identification, the prospects do not 
look good for a coherent concept of hy-
perintellectual. However, I have elected 
to simply mention these issues, delaying 
a more rigorous analysis for another time, 
or to be carried out by someone else.
Pause
To be honest, some may find this descrip-
tion of the intellectual to be contestable. 
They may even doubt whether the in-
tellectual holds as a distinction from the 
non-intellectual. But even if there is a 
deep affinity between many or most in-
tellectuals, intellectuals are not as mono-
lithic a group as one might think. There 
are many kinds of intellectual to be con-
sidered—people who are less opposi-
tional and educate in ways that are less 
promoting of good epistemic agency and 
democratic culture, or do not have much 
interest in moral virtues, but who do en-
gage in considerable action.
We are left, thus, with a group of spec-
tra. Think of each of the four character-
istic spectrums as ordered arrangements 
of a particular characteristic with an as-
signed value on the interval [0, 1] indicat-
ing the extent to which the characteristic 
is exhibited. A value of 1 indicates that 
the characteristic is fully exhibited, while 
a value of 0 indicates the characteristic is 
not exhibited whatsoever. This might sug-
gest that there are only 14 combinations 
and, so, only 14 kinds of hypointellectual. 
But there are values in between 0 and 1 for 
each spectrum, thereby greatly increasing 
the kinds of hypointellectual. Recalling 
the previously noted set of characteris-
tics—less oppositional, less promotional 
of epistemic agency and democratic cul-
ture, less interested in moral virtues, but 
action oriented—we might simply as-
sign the following values [.6, .5, .6, .9] to 
make up its unique spectral set. What this 
“spectral description” affords us is a much 
more encompassing definition that is not 
confined to the traditional labels of leftist, 
or, neo-conservative. In fact, I am not sure 
how these traditional categories would 
be understood in terms of spectral sets. 
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However, what is most important about 
these sets is that higher numerical values 
get us closer to the sort of intellectual—
the hyperintellectual—that is needed to 
promote a culture of dialogue, tolerance, 
moderation, and the mutually benefi-
cial resolution of conflicts. Accordingly, 
someone is a hyperintellectual to the 
extent to which he or she reflects those 
characteristics that promote such a cul-
ture in a non-partisan manner, which is 
the principal distinguishing characteristic 
between the hyperintellectual and the hy-
pointellectual.
It is also important to keep in mind 
that hyperintellectuals operate within 
the space of civil society, a space that is 
crucial for geographical territories that 
are in need of democratization (Bremer 
and McConnell 2006; Chandler 2000; 
Diamond 1994, 2005; Fine 1996; Held 
1995; Seligman 1992). Two post-conflict 
territories in need of democratization are 
Bosnia and Kosovo, places in which the 
International Community’s (IC) recon-
struction efforts continue to include the 
creation of civil societies and the democ-
racies that such societies help to sustain.
Although these efforts look upon polit-
ical institutions like “free, fair, and frequent 
elections” and “freedom of expression” as 
crucial for democracy (Dahl 2005), these 
institutions are only as effective as the cul-
ture that “holds” them together (Gibson 
2004) or the web that suspends them 
(Geertz 1973). Integral to this support 
is civil society, for it is within this space 
that culture shapes how people behave 
politically. As Bruce Parrot reminds us, 
“It stands to reason that political culture 
affects whether citizens choose to support 
moderate or extreme political movements 
and parties, and whether they choose to 
engage in democratic or anti-democrat-
ic forms of political participation” (1997: 
21-22). This is no less true for Bosnia 
and Kosovo, where a culture of dialogue, 
tolerance, moderation, and the mutually 
beneficial resolution of conflicts is crucial 
for democracy building. So, I now turn to 
a consideration of civil society and how 
the hyperintellectual can act to enhance 
understanding and reduce divisiveness 
between rivals.
The Hyperintellectual’s Task:
Building a Climate of Understanding
The Public Sphere and Civil Society
In establishing the relationship between 
the hyperintellectual and civil society, it 
is important to first understand the idea 
of public sphere as explored by Jürgen 
Habermas in “Offentlichkeit” (1989) and 
the idea of civil society as formulated by 
Michael Walzer in “The Idea of Civil 
Society” (1991). Habermas characterized 
the public sphere as
a domain of our social life in which 
such a thing as public opinion can be 
formed. Access to the public sphere is 
open in principle to all citizens. A por-
tion of the public sphere is constituted 
in every conversation in which private 
persons come together to form a pub-
lic….Citizens act as a public when 
they deal with matters of general in-
terest without being subject to coer-
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cion….We speak of a political public 
sphere….when the public discussions 
concern objects connected with the 
practice of the state (1989: 231).
The public sphere appears when peo-
ple come to together to discuss public 
concerns, with the “political” variant being 
created when those individuals discuss 
matters of politics. In other words, the po-
litical sphere is created with the “dialogi-
cal publicity” of one’s politics. It is never a 
matter of remaining “private,” but always 
a matter of being within a discursive space.
But as Noëlle McAfee notes in Haber-
mas, Kristeva and Citizenship, the public 
sphere is neither the lived, communi-
cative space of the home or work place, 
nor is it a part of the official structure 
and mechanism of governance (2000: 
81-101). Instead, the public sphere is a 
social space in which people can freely 
come together to engage in meaningful 
dialogue about issues that concern them 
(Habermas 1996: 360-361). It is that part 
of the spatial network which exists be-
tween the private sphere and the state.
What then of the relationship be-
tween the public sphere and civil society? 
Walzer points out, “‘civil society’ name[s] 
the space of uncoerced human association 
and also the set of relational networks—
formed for the sake of family, faith, in-
terest, and ideology—that fill this space” 
(2002: 293). Civil society is a more en-
compassing space because it includes the 
entire array of public spheres. Although 
civil society involves a communicative en-
counter, the emphasis here is on civil soci-
ety as an “associational life.” But of what 
exactly are the networks composed? For 
Walzer, they include the “unions, church-
es, political parties and movements, coop-
eratives, neighborhoods, schools of tho-
ught, societies for promoting or prevent-
ing this and that” (293). Student and tra-
de unions, churches, and the like, how-
ever, do not fully describe civil society’s 
networks, for these networks also include 
associations such as garden and bowling 
clubs, interest groups, and coffee klatch-
es (McAfee 2000: 83). There are also the 
press, professional organizations, wom-
en’s organizations, and non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). These associ-
ations and networks of common interest 
or concern (which in many cases have 
little, if any, regard for politics) occasion-
ally allow people to leave the confines of 
their homes and workplaces to enter into 
a more expansive common life, whereby 
civility can be furthered and the good life 
made pronounced.
But the means by which people today 
operate within civil society have changed 
radically with the arrival of the Internet. 
Not only has the Internet made the more 
traditional “brick and mortar” venues and 
institutions easier to manage and more 
reachable, but the Internet has allowed 
new tools like email, blogs, and open let-
ters to help create powerful networks of 
communicative encounters and human 
association that are incredibly more ex-
pansive, less centralized, and more spon-
taneous than past networks. There is no 
question the situation has been decidedly 
improved by technological innovation.
But what about the relationship be-
tween civil society and democracy? The 
belief that civil society is not only com-
patible with or promotional of democ-
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racy, but that a strong civil society is an 
essential building block of democracy is 
widely held and often expressed. This is 
particularly evident from the coverage and 
analysis of the Colour Revolutions (Rose-
Georgia 2003; Orange-Ukraine 2004-
2005; Blue-Kuwait 2005); the Yugoslav 
5 October Revolution (2000 Bulldozer 
Revolution); and the more recent Spring 
Revolutions (Arab 2010-; Turkey 2013-; 
Ukraine [Euromaiden] 2013-; Venezuela 
2014-; and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2014). In many of these, particularly the 
Color Revolutions, NGOs played an im-
portant role in the advocacy of democracy. 
However, we would be misleading our-
selves in denying that civil society “can 
be racist, exclusionary, backward and re-
calcitrant” (McAfee 2000: 84). Bosnia 
and Kosovo, being settings of deeply-
entrenched conflicts, are still dealing with 
the divisiveness of xenophobia and chau-
vinism related to ethnic nationalism. In 
those cases, associational life may have 
little to do with civility, at least civility as it 
pertains to interethnic group interaction.
Harold Saunder’s distinction between 
“civil society” and “democratic civil soci-
ety” is illuminating and gives us an ideal 
to work towards. Whereas the former is 
simply that complex network of associa-
tions and relationships that citizens gen-
erate to deal with the problems they face 
throughout life, the latter reflects a “quali-
tative” change in the sort of network that 
the person is a part of, i.e., “the ways citi-
zens relate within … [groups] and how 
these groups relate to others—[through] 
deliberation, dialogue, collaboration rath-
er than authoritarian or adversarial inter-
actions” (2005: 58). The importance of the 
former over the later cannot be under-
stated for democracy. This has been put so 
nicely by David Cooper in his 2007 essay, 
“Is Civic Discourse Still Alive?” that it is 
worth repeating at length:
 
Simply put, civic discourse is that mode 
of collective democratic counsel. It is 
the way citizens think about, form, and 
articulate their relations with public is-
sues. Civic discourse happens through 
speech acts that span all sorts of rhe-
torical forms and practices, from dia-
tribe and polemic to argument, debate, 
deliberation, and, not the least as we 
shall see, ordinary face-to-face conver-
sation and personal narrative. I like to 
think of civic discourse as the rhetori-
cal framework of democracy. It has to 
be strong enough to support and pre-
serve the durable footings of demo-
cratic dissent—assembly, free speech, 
petitions of grievance. Its joints need 
to be flexible enough to accommodate 
changing climates, new voices, and 
new modes of communication such 
as digital environments and global 
information networks. And yet the 
framework needs enough human scale 
and respect for vernacular to sustain 
democracy as local, intimate, and in-
terpersonal (2014: 115).
Admittedly, the hypointellectual and 
the hyperintellectual each play a role with-
in a democratic civil society, an environ-
ment rich in civil discourse, but their roles 
are not the same because of the presence 
or absence of partisanship. Returning to 
Cooper, we can see how those roles play 
out:
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The public sphere—the marketplace 
of civic discourses in a democracy—is 
neither a boxing ring nor a place of 
perfect harmony or dependable con-
sensus-building. Instead, public cul-
ture is pulled between these extremes, 
while language practices tend to obey 
the historical, political, and social forc-
es that set public culture in motion. At 
any one moment in time it may seem as 
though civic discourse ebbs strongly—
pulled by the tidal action, for example, 
of a nation’s recovery from the shared 
traumas of war, economic depression, 
natural disaster, and dislocation—or 
wanes precipitously, following the ac-
tive fault lines of national divisions, 
ideological inertia, partisan gridlock, 
and exhausted social capital. [This is 
a]...view of civic discourse that oscil-
lates between these extremes, one that 
both encourages consensus-building 
and deliberative action and tolerates 
conflict, argument, and sharp elbows 
(117-118).
Perhaps the roles are captured in the 
following way: the hypointellectual tends 
to “work against” the Other, whereas the 
hyperintellectual tends to “work with” the 
Other.
What we have here, then, is the prop-
agation of a democratic culture that can 
help to ward off an overpowering state 
and constrain the more authoritarian el-
ements within society.24 The groups that 
contribute to this culture often do so as 
“the vanguard of political reform and de-
24 Paul Bremer refers to trade unions, political 
parties, and professional organizations as the 
“social ‘shock absorbers’” that “help cushion 
the individual from an overpowering govern-
ment” (2006: 12).
mands for governmental transparency” 
as noted by Benazir Bhutto in her book 
Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the 
West (2008: 291). She goes on to write:
They are the internal election moni-
tors. They stand up against violations 
of human rights. They work with in-
ternational groups that promote de-
mocracy to guarantee a fair political 
process but not a guaranteed political 
outcome (291). 
But to acknowledge that civil society 
is Janus-faced, as Saunders leads us to be-
lieve, is to recognize its fragility. Thinkers 
and doers of all kinds, including the ethnic 
nationalist variety, often become self-pro-
claimed intellectuals who proudly show 
their xenophobia and chauvinism in the 
hope of increasing their ranks and power 
within an increasingly fragmented soci-
ety. Thus, they operate within civil society 
in ways that are antithetical to democratic 
culture. But no matter how precarious the 
situation, the ideal is for civil society to 
incorporate an increasingly democratic 
culture of dialogue, tolerance, modera-
tion, and mutually beneficial resolution 
of conflicts. Clearly, the political public 
sphere can play a dominant role in pro-
moting a democratic culture; moreover, I 
submit that the hyperintellectual can play 
a dominant role within this sphere.
Hyperintellectualism in Bosnian 
Democratization and Peace-Building
How might the hyperintellectual express 
his or her presence in developing a demo-
cratic culture within the political sphere of 
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civil society? The hyperintellectual might 
be useful in enhancing understanding 
between rivals which could lead to a re-
duction in the divisiveness between them. 
Remember that the hyperintellectual is 
a social critic, a political educator, a per-
son of action, and a caring insider bun-
dled in a non-partisan way. It is by being 
a social critic as expressed in an opposi-
tionality to any single ideology, a political 
educator as shown by a commitment to 
motivate people through good counsel 
to become responsible citizens who can 
live and work together, a person of action 
expressed in an engagement that brings 
about concrete change in society, and a 
person who cares about the target society 
that the hyperintellectual can help to pro-
mote and sustain dialogue, understand-
ing, tolerance, moderation, and mutually 
beneficial resolution of conflicts as the 
core elements of a democratic culture. By 
“showing how engagement is done,” the 
hyperintellectual helps to develop a dem-
ocratic political culture.
But how might this engagement play 
out in civil society? What exactly is the 
hyperintellectual up against? For quite 
some time this engagement meant the 
hyperintellectual had to hone in on the 
relationship between the International 
Community and the ethnic nationalists 
(whether in or out of government).Given 
that the IC’s peace-building efforts were 
the mechanism through which progress 
could be anticipated, getting the IC and 
nationalists of all kinds to work togeth-
er was essential for success. However, the 
IC’s administration of Bosnia is seen at 
times to be contrary to the interests of 
the various ethnic communities, with the 
potential of producing more and more di-
visiveness. But if the hyperintellectual can 
successfully argue for the moral legitima-
cy of these efforts, these efforts may be 
one less source of divisiveness. (This also 
applies to arguing against the moral le-
gitimacy of those efforts in favor of some 
alternative. Whichever way, the key is to 
reach some sort of persuasive equilibrium 
that leads to increased welfare).
But this is not an easy task. After 
all, the war in Bosnia unleashed a toxic 
combination of ideology, national inter-
ests, power, and violence that led to the 
deaths of many tens of thousands of peo-
ple and diminished welfare of those who 
survived. Given the nexus of the conflict, 
the antagonists themselves were unable to 
bring about an end to the conflict, caus-
ing the IC to eventually intervene, re-
sulting in a “sign or else” agreement (the 
Dayton Peace Agreement) that included 
long-term international involvement that 
was non-negotiable. The IC was doing its 
best to influence the decision-making of 
the belligerents to accept an agreement 
that would turn Bosnia into an interna-
tional protectorate for the foreseeable fu-
ture.25 It could be said that from the very 
25 This is not a case of libertarian paternalism 
as developed by Sunstein and Thaler (2014).
Whereas in some loose way the influence 
brought to bear on the belligerents by the IC 
could be construed as its paternalistic aspect 
insofar as there is an attempt “to steer people’s 
choices in directions that will improve the 
chooser’s own welfare,” there is not much that 
smacks of being libertarian because it lacks 
the freedom to “opt out of specified arrange-
ments if they choose to do so” (1161-1162). 
For more on libertarian paternalism, see Sun-
stein (2014) and Thaler and Sunstein (2003) 
and (2009).
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beginning the IC’s efforts at improving 
the welfare of those affected through de-
mocratization and peace-building were 
framed in terms of the diminution of state 
sovereignty and autonomy (Chandler 
2000: 34-35).
Indeed, the obstructionism inherent in 
ethnic nationalist politics was an impetus 
for drafting the DPA in a way that man-
dated the IC taking on the role of manager 
of the Bosnian state. To be more specific, 
the UN High Representatives, being the 
final authorities in Bosnia regarding the 
interpretation and implementation of Ar-
ticle V of Annex 10 (Agreement of Civili-
an Implementation of the Peace Settle-
ment or DPA) to the General Framework 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and being the recipients of the Bonn 
Powers of 1997, for years resorted to us-
ing a heavy-handed approach in coun-
tering the negative effects this ideology 
had on the civil implementation of the 
DPA. Sometimes the intervention has 
been directed at the state level, such as 
when High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch removed Ante Jelavić from his 
position in the three-member Presidency 
of BiH in March 2001 on the grounds 
that Jelavić was seriously obstructing the 
implementation of the DPA.26 A similar 
situation occurred in March 2005 when 
High Representative Paddy Ashdown 
26 Jelavić’s obstructionist behavior began with 
an illegal political demonstration on Election 
Day in November 2000 and a provocative 
speech in 28 February 2001 in Busovača, and 
it culminated on 3 March 2001 with a gath-
ering in Mostar that was the occasion for an 
unconstitutional initiative meant to establish 
illegal parallel institutions.
dismissed Dragan Čović from the Presi-
dency of BiH.
At other times the intervention has 
been directed at the municipal level. The 
January 2004 decree made by Ashdown 
is a case in point. After years of eroding 
the civic and multi-ethnic character of 
the city of Mostar, evidenced by the ex-
istence of costly parallel municipal struc-
tures and services—over US$19 million 
annually (Alic 2004), and the unwilling-
ness of members of the two ethnic-based 
ruling parties in Mostar, the Bosniac 
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and 
the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH 
(HDZ BiH), to engage earnestly in mu-
nicipal governance, Ashdown, in the ex-
ercise of the powers vested in the posi-
tion of High Representative, presented 
the people of Mostar with the statute 
by which their city would be governed.27 
Being an advocate of the multiethnic 
structure of Bosnia and recognizing that 
the unification of the city of Mostar was 
one of the preconditions for Bosnia to 
sign the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA), a precursor to EU 
membership, Ashdown made the need to 
break the stalemate by imposing measures 
an imperative “even if...[those measures] 
are sometimes a little antidemocratic” 
(Ashdown 2004). Not only would the 
statute reflect the “unity theme” by creat-
ing a single, multiethnic administration, 
but it would provide a streamline elec-
toral process that would at the same time 
attempt to take care of the needs of the 
27 See Paddy Ashdown’s 28 January 2004 
Speech and his 28 January 2004 “Decision 
Enacting the Statute of the City of Mostar.” 
Both available from World Wide Web (http://
www.ohr.int).
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constituent peoples and others. Instead 
of there being 194 elected officials, there 
would only be 35, and they would be elect-
ed through a process by which 3 would 
be sent from each of the 6 newly created 
electoral units and the remaining council 
members would be elected in a city-wide 
vote. In addition, there would be provi-
sions for establishing minimum numbers 
of council members for each constituent 
people and the others, as well as setting 
a maximum number of council members 
for each of the constituent peoples at 15, 
making sure that “no constituent people 
can be dominated by another” (Ashdown 
2004). This unyielding and uncompro-
mising measure and those that preceded 
it were understood by many in the IC 
as justified because they were in keeping 
with the wide mandate of the DPA and 
its numerous annexes and extensions.
Now, it so happens that in June 2011 
and January 2012, the BiH Constitutional 
Court ruled that the electoral system of 
the Mostar statute was both unconstitu-
tional and discriminatory.28 Apparently, 
the rulings by the Constitutional Court 
did not strike down the statute, but only 
the electoral process. Unfortunately for the 
people of Mostar, lawmakers in Bosnia’s 
House of Representatives failed to adopt 
changes to the electoral law for Mostar 
28 It was unconstitutional insofar as there 
was a tremendous discrepancy in the number 
of votes that were required to elect council 
members from each city unit and that the vot-
ers in the central zone were only able to elect 
council members from the citywide list of 
candidates. It was found to be discriminatory 
insofar as the voters from the central zone 
were not provided with equal voting rights 
(see Ashdown 2004).
on 14 May 2014, which once again took 
Mostar out of the local election cycle in 
October 2014 ( Jukic 2014).
In passing, however, it is worth men-
tioning that the High Representative and 
the OHR appear to have taken a slight-
ly less hands-on approach to the politi-
cal quagmire in Bosnia over the past few 
years. Although the Prime Minister of 
the Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik 
campaigned during the 2010 Presidential 
election on a platform of veiled secession 
and engineered the crisis over the refer-
endum that would have challenged the 
legitimacy of the national judicial sys-
tem and the powers vested in the HR, 
Dodik was never sacked. On the con-
trary, he is currently the President of the 
Republika Srpska. Yet until the High Re-
presentative’s mandate is ended and the 
conditions for closure of the OHR met, 
nationalists of all persuasions will contin-
ue to find at least some of the practices 
of these foreign overseers to be unaccept-
able, thus creating a project for the hyper-
intellectual.
But there is more. Another project, as 
crucial as the first, concerns the demand 
by many Bosnians for accountability and 
dignity of their own government officials 
that started in earnest with the Babylution 
of 2013 but that kicked into high gear 
with the Spring 2014 protests and subse-
quent plena (McRobie 2014).29 More and 
29 The Great Flood of 2014 that struck por-
tions of the Balkans could be the pretext for 
those in power to take back control from the 
plena and those who oppose the state and 
the IC. This refers not only to Naomi Klein’s 
(2007) “disaster capitalism,” but also to what I 
call “disaster governance.”
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more Bosnians have grown tired of the 
legislative stalemate that has paralyzed 
the country and that has led to direct 
militancy. This includes many people who 
were previously indifferent to activism. 
They are fed up with the incompetence, 
greed, and corruption of their politicians 
who are increasingly seen as caretakers of 
a peace agreement run amok. Moreover, 
the electorate is becoming wiser to the 
willful blindness—the intentional place-
ment into a position of being unaware of 
the facts in order to avoid civil or crimi-
nal liability—of those who are in power, 
whether they be government officials or 
corporate managers. Facing loss of power 
it is no wonder some of these individu-
als preach deafness to the human suf-
fering around them. The causative nexus 
may not be completely understood, but it 
is reasonable to think that much of this 
growing unrest is not ideologically driven, 
ethnic nationalist or otherwise. The battle 
between ideologues is not a precursor for 
the hyperintellectuals’ involvement; the 
hyperintellectual can just as well foster 
understanding between citizen groups, 
government officials, and corporate lead-
ers so as to make any debate more mean-
ingful and efficacious.
But it is to the tension between the 
democratization and peace-building ef-
forts of the IC and the nationalists that 
we turn to as a point of entry for the hy-
perintellectual, one that is crafted within 
a theoretical framework that is broadly 
construed in terms of paternalism and 
libertarianism. At the center of the debate 
over the moral legitimacy of democrati-
zation and peace-building in Bosnia are 
the crucial but rarely posed questions of 
whether such efforts are, on the one hand, 
instances of self-protection or paternal-
ism, or, on the other hand, straightfor-
ward means to greater degrees of auton-
omy (not exactly libertarianism). If the 
IC is to successfully guide the rebuilding 
of Bosnia by gaining the cooperation of 
the Bosnians themselves, they must do 
more than give their policies and decrees 
a purely legalistic justification vis-á-vis 
the DPA. Those of the IC must examine 
the moral justification of their work and 
ask how their efforts are judged in terms 
of protectionism, paternalism, and auton-
omy-enhancing.30 A sketch of how the 
hyperintellectual might proceed would be 
useful.
Unlike motorcycle helmets and retire-
ment programs or default rules and the 
notion of voluntariness that are the stan-
dard fare in the debate over paternalism 
in America (see Dworkin 1983; Sunstein 
and Thaler 2003; Salvat 2008), the poli-
cies of the High Representative and the 
OHR as juxtaposed to recalcitrant ethnic 
nationalist segments of Bosnian soci-
ety are only adequately framed within a 
broader context of self-protectionism, pa-
ternalism, and autonomy enhancement. 
In order to meaningfully contribute with-
in this context, the hyperintellectual must 
first define ‘self-protectionism’ and ‘pa-
ternalism’, and then decide which of the 
IC’s measures fall under each. In search-
ing for a starting point, Gerald Dworkin’s 
“Paternalism,” is an excellent choice. We 
30 Autonomy is the capacity to be a self-leg-
islating agent who takes responsibility for his 
or her actions.
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get a sense of what self-protection means 
in the following passage by Mill that is 
much quoted by Dworkin:
The sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty of action 
of any of their number, is self-protec-
tion. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others (Dworkin 1983: 19; Mill 1962: 
135). 
Mill ends this passage with a state-
ment that is not quoted by Dworkin: “His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not 
sufficient warrant” (135). The sort of con-
duct that Mill has in mind is not purely 
self-regarding or personal; it is other-
regarding. And given that it is important 
to protect the integrity of the individual 
so that he or she can enjoy being an au-
tonomous agent, self-protection is suffi-
cient to warrant intervention in the lives 
of others.
How does this conduct relate to Bos-
nia? Suppose nationalist elites were par-
alyzing municipal institutions of the city 
of Mostar through political feuding and 
genuine incompetence, thereby hamper-
ing the distribution of the much needed 
services of water, electricity, law enforce-
ment, and trash collection to the city’s 
residents. If going without these goods 
and services meant that people were 
harmed, and if Ashdown’s 2004 decree 
were intended to prevent Bosnian na-
tionalist elites from causing further harm, 
then there would be at least a prima fa-
cie warrant for such a decree. And if be-
ing harmed by doing without goods and 
services diminishes one’s autonomy, then 
the cessation of harm can only be auton-
omy-enhancing. It is a prima facie war-
rant, however, because a clear burden of 
proof must be placed on the authorities to 
demonstrate the exact nature of the harm 
being done to the residents of Mostar and 
how the High Representative’s measures 
will prevent further harm and enhance 
autonomy. The burden of proof is need-
ed not only because any interference with 
people’s liberty of action in such dramatic 
ways needs to be justified, but also be-
cause it can reasonably be assumed that 
each measure taken by the IC is likely to 
be viewed as an attempt to undermine na-
tionalist interests, in which case providing 
a justification would preempt nationalist 
rhetoric. What makes the hyperintellec-
tual’s argument for the warrant, as well as 
its being a prima facie warrant, especially 
important is, in part, that it is non-parti-
san: it gives voice to both sides and pres-
ents the hyperintellectual as “having no 
dog in the fight.” And without a dog in 
the fight, the hyperintellectual acquires a 
certain degree of acceptance by both the 
nationalist and the representative of the 
International Community.
But might some of these same mea-
sures have a paternalistic dimension as 
well? Perhaps, but only after confusing 
paternalism for something else. Suppose 
we follow Dworkin’s definition of pater-
nalism, which is “the interference with a 
person’s liberty of action justified by rea-
sons referring exclusively to the welfare, 
good, happiness, needs, interests, or val-
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ues of the person being coerced” (1983: 
20). If we focus on the rationale for im-
plementing more coercive peace-building 
measures like restricting nationalist elites 
from political participation and eliminat-
ing parallel institutions, we can acknowl-
edge that the reasons originally adduced 
to support these measures do in fact re-
flect “the welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests, or values” of Bosnians. But these 
measures, as in the case of Mostar, are a 
tough response to actions that are harm-
ing residents of that city. So to say that 
the IC’s efforts are paternalistic suggests 
paternalism to be something it is not, i.e., 
wholly concerned with other-regarding 
conduct. As I read Dworkin, however, pa-
ternalism is concerned with self-regard-
ing conduct or matters that are “exclusive” 
to the person. But the feuding and in-
competence in Mostar is none other than 
other-regarding conduct. Consequently, 
the discussion need go no further: the sort 
of peace-building measures that we have 
in mind are all other-regarding and so fall 
outside paternalism. The most that can be 
given is a protectionist justification. Yet 
ending this discussion may be premature.
Although the IC may construe these 
more coercive peace-building measures as 
imposing restrictions on other-regarding 
conduct, thereby allowing the IC to pro-
tect people from certain kinds of harm, 
nationalists may still disagree with this 
view. In fact, ethnic nationalists of what-
ever kind may not only claim that no 
harm is being done to members of other 
groups, but may also claim that the con-
duct in which they are engaged is self-
regarding insofar as it allows members of 
their own ethnic group to behave in ways 
that they deem important and that reflect 
their conception of who they are as indi-
viduals possessing a certain ethnic iden-
tity. Thus, some of those peace-building 
measures that are said to be protection-
ist are now construed by the nationalist 
as paternalistic and, therefore, unjustified.
Here, too, the hyperintellectual must 
place a heavy and clear burden of proof 
on nationalists and members of the IC 
to demonstrate the presence or absence 
of risk of harm, because the argument for 
paternalism turns on there being neither 
harm nor the likelihood of harm to oth-
ers. If no harm is being done, then the 
conduct that is being addressed by in-
terventionism must be other-regarding, 
thereby making the claim of paternalism 
groundless and eliminating any need for 
the IC to argue for justifiable paternalism.
It may seem that proving or disprov-
ing harm or the risk of harm is a relatively 
simple task. However, harm is understood 
in different ways. A young man, for ex-
ample, who is a Bosnian Croat nationalist 
living in Mostar, may look at the paral-
lel institutions and acknowledge that the 
feuding and incompetence have led to 
some “inconvenience” to the residents of 
west Mostar, yet still believe this a bet-
ter arrangement and a step toward ac-
quiring more autonomy and the eventual 
creation of a Croat state within Bosnia. 
Is this inconvenience the sort of harm 
that other-regarding conduct and protec-
tionism require? Or is this arrangement 
a matter of self-regarding conduct that 
is for the person’s “own good” (or, now 
it seems, group-regarding conduct), and 
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thus off limits to intervention? On the 
other hand, the High Representative may 
claim that this is exactly what is meant 
by harm and that there is much more to 
come, e.g., the possibility of renewed vi-
olence because of the divisiveness caused 
by ethnic nationalism.
The situation is obviously more com-
plicated than this. Take, for example, that 
same Bosnian Croat nationalist living 
in west Mostar. Suppose he possesses a 
strong sense of solidarity with his eth-
nic community and believes that what 
is good for the Croats of Mostar is also 
good for him. He has been made aware of 
the evils of ethnic nationalism but con-
tinues to remain true to his beliefs by re-
peatedly voting for and giving consent to 
his nationalist leaders. Is this a case of not 
sufficiently understanding or correctly ap-
preciating the dangers that may await the 
nationalist? If so, do we judge the young 
man’s voting behavior to be unreasonable 
though not irrational?31 And if the High 
Representative responds by saying that 
most reasonable people do not wish dis-
ruptions in their utilities and being vic-
timized by violent assault, thus presum-
ing that this individual did not wish to 
run those risks either, then what do the 
nationalist and High Representative have 
to talk about? (see Feinberg 2003). Not 
much, though the hyperintellectual can 
do much to further this conversation.
However, the hyperintellectual is also 
characterized as someone who is an insid-
er, who cares about the society in question, 
31 See Salvat (2003: 12) for Feinberg’s distinc-
tion between reasonable and rational.
a caring that is predicated on the posses-
sion of the moral virtues of courage, com-
passion, and a good eye. Of these, com-
passion is particularly interesting given 
its role in the inflationary model of mo-
rality, a model that can support democ-
racy building by enlarging moral space 
through the utilization of empathy (and 
hospitality). Even though people tend 
to pride themselves on being tolerant of 
others, democratization may be better 
served in the long run through empathy 
and hospitality.32 In what follows, I shall 
discuss this model of morality so that the 
last connection can be made between the 
hyperintellectual and democratization.
The Hyperintellectual’s Task: 
Enlarging Moral Space
The Inflationary Model of Morality
Since the beginning of Western moral 
philosophy some twenty-five hundred 
years ago in Greece, there has been a de-
bate concerning the relation between rea-
son and emotion. If we understand moral 
32 Martin Marty points out that “one of the 
problems with tolerance within pluralism is 
that those who tolerate often have the power 
or the will to remake “the other” into some 
manageable image. Hospitality permits—in-
deed, it insists on—regarding the other as 
being really different” (2005: 124). Surely, 
we want to move beyond mere tolerance. 
Whereas hospitality is a movement towards 
recognizing and welcoming me for who I am, 
tolerance suggests that those who occupy a 
privileged position get to decide whether to 
put up with me.
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philosophy as a reasoned analysis of the 
nature of morality and all that it requires 
of us, then we find throughout Plato’s di-
alogues what amounts to the beginning 
of a very long debate over “how we ought 
to live.” It is reason rather than emotion 
that prevails in our deliberations. When 
it comes to searching for a “universal 
and objective” foundation of morality, it 
is again reason that is found to be the 
worthy candidate. Kant is the epitome of 
this reason-bound view of morality. He 
argued that it is not because we possess 
the capacity for feeling that we are moral 
agents, but because we have the capacity 
for reason. At the heart of morality is re-
spect for others, which unfolds from the 
supreme moral principle: The Categorical 
Imperative. If we are to respect other per-
sons, as stated in The Formula of the End 
of Itself, it is because we ought to “act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end” (Kant 
1967: 91).
But should respect for others be our 
sole interest? What about concern for 
others, i.e., care shown towards the Other’s 
autonomy? As Arne Johan Vetlesen 
points out in his Perception, Empathy, and 
Judgment, Kant has no place for concern 
within morality because concern turns 
on our capacity for feeling (1994: 1). 
But perhaps Vetlesen is correct to ques-
tion the opposition between respect and 
concern. Could someone have respect for 
others, i.e., take into account the integrity 
of those other persons—their inviolable 
right to decide what is in their best inter-
ests—and not “show any concern for the 
weal and woe of those others” (1994: 2)? 
Similarly, does it even make sense to talk 
of showing concern for someone while 
not also having respect for that person? 
Not at all, for autonomy and integrity 
seem to work together. Clearly, there is a 
place for concern in moral performance.
Of course, reason is important in mo-
rality, particularly when the very possibil-
ity of rational discourse concerning moral 
judgments is cast aside by those who have 
adopted a faith-driven morality. I believe 
the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett is 
correct when he writes that
anybody who professes that a partic-
ular point of moral conviction is not 
discussable, not debatable, not nego-
tiable, simply because it is the word 
of God, or because the Bible says so, 
or because “that is what all Muslims...
believe, and I am a Muslim...” should 
be seen to be making it impossible for 
the rest of us to take their views se-
riously, excusing themselves from the 
moral conversation, inadvertently ac-
knowledging that their own views are 
not conscientiously maintained and 
deserve no further hearing (2006: B8).
He goes on to explain: 
Suppose you believe that stem-cell re-
search is wrong because God has told 
you so. Even if you are right—that is, 
even if God does exist and has, person-
ally, told you that stem-cell research is 
wrong—you cannot reasonably expect 
others who do not share your faith or 
experience to accept that as a reason. 
The fact that your faith is so strong 
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that you cannot do otherwise just 
shows...that you are disabled for mor-
al persuasion....And if you reply that 
you can, but you won’t consider rea-
sons for and against your conviction,...
you avow your willful refusal to abide 
by the minimal conditions of rational 
discussion (2006: B8).
Therefore, there is something to the 
primacy traditionally given to reason. 
And it is understandable why many have 
taken the standard model to be an accept-
able alternative to faith-driven morality, 
for we are not talking about matters of 
taste but moral concerns that require ra-
tional justification.
Even so, perhaps we need a more “ho-
listic” account of morality—i.e., an infla-
tionary model—that includes, but is not 
limited to, reason’s role in making moral 
judgments through the use of principles 
and norms, in order to more adequately 
capture the moral predicament of per-
sons who are endowed with both emo-
tional and intellectual faculties. Indeed, 
we must explain how we become “atten-
tive” to such a predicament.33 Perception, 
Empathy, and Judgment is very helpful in 
this regard. Vetlesen “retrieves” the notion 
of moral perception and the importance 
of emotion, particularly empathy, for this 
perception which he cites as the first stage 
of moral performance.
Exploring moral performance in this 
33 Even Nussbaum goes so far as to acknowl-
edge that moral principles do not apply them-
selves to situations; we also require percep-
tions of the salient features of the situation in 
which we find ourselves (2012: 143).
way offers a more adequate account of 
morality, for we realize that the emotional 
faculty of empathy is our principal mode 
of access to the moral domain, which is 
showing concern and having respect for 
others. Moreover, in recognizing the im-
portance of empathy for moral percep-
tion and thus for moral performance, 
Vetlesen’s inflationary model provides us 
with the theoretical basis needed to un-
derstand how the hyperintellectual can 
promote the formation of a democratic 
culture by expanding the moral space of 
ethnic nationalists.
The Inflationary Model, 
the Hyperintellectual,
and Democratization in the Balkans
What, then, are the relevant aspects of 
the inflationary model for demonstrating 
the other way in which the hyperintellec-
tual can contribute to democratization? 
The notion of moral performance is an 
overarching one. It includes, but is not 
limited to, the more often talked about 
concept of moral agency.34 Agency refers 
to the capacity to make moral judgments 
and be motivated to act in certain ways. 
In short, it offers an explanation of how 
moral considerations are action-guiding. 
But a moral theory that adequately at-
tends to the scope of moral performance 
must include not only judgment and ac-
tion, but also moral predicament. This is 
because a predicament invokes judgment 
34 See Arpaly (2003) and Korsgaard (2009) 
for discussions of moral agency.
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and action. So regardless of whether two 
well-informed, rational individuals who 
use the same moral theory make similar 
moral judgments and act in similar ways, 
it is crucial that the two individuals first 
“attend” to the objects of moral judg-
ments. How do we come in contact with 
the “stuff ” of moral judgments? Vetlesen’s 
answer is simple:
Moral perception provides and shapes 
the setting for moral judgment and 
moral action. Moral judgment is con-
cerned with the cognitive grasp, as-
sessment, and weighing of the weal 
and woe, of the well-being, interests, 
and rights of all the parties affected by 
a situation…In passing judgment on 
how best to act considering the view-
points of all concerned..., I will need 
norms and principles to guide me in 
my deliberations. But my cognitive-
intellectual knowledge in this field…
comes to naught and remains impo-
tent if I am not sensitive to, if I do 
not “see”..., the situation at hand as a 
morally relevant one....The sequence 
of moral performance is set in motion 
by an act of moral perception. Moral 
perception takes place prior to moral 
judgment and provides the basis for its 
exercise (4-5). 
What allows us to “see” the situation 
as a morally relevant one? Vetlesen writes:
We experience the objects of mor-
al judgments through emotion….
Emotions anchor us to the particular 
moral circumstance, to the aspect of 
a situation that addresses us imme-
diately, to the here and now. To “see” 
the circumstance and to see oneself 
as addressed by it, and thus to be sus-
ceptible to the way a situation affects 
the weal and woe of others, in short, 
to identify a situation as carrying mor-
al significance in the first place—all of 
this is required in order to enter the 
domain of the moral, and none of it 
would come about without the basic 
emotional faculty of empathy (4). 
In further characterizing empathy, 
Vetlesen adds the following:
It is by virtue of this faculty that I can 
put myself in the place of the other by 
way of a feeling-into and feeling-with. 
Empathy allows me to develop an 
appreciation of how the other expe-
riences his or her situation; empathy 
facilitates the first reaching out toward 
and gaining access to the other’s expe-
rience, but empathy does not… mean 
that I myself come to feel what the 
other feels. I do not have to feel the 
other’s feeling in order to grasp, and 
thereupon be able to judge in light of, 
how the other experiences the situa-
tion he or she is in (8). 
Given that moral perception is what 
“initiates” moral performance, a person’s 
inattentiveness or indifference—lack of 
empathy—to the moral circumstances of 
a situation, will have devastating results 
for passing judgments. Perhaps this is 
less of a problem for those who reside in 
situations of relative tranquility, for there 
will be frequent personal interactions that 
are “felt” to be positive. At some point 
the basic emotional faculty of empathy 
is triggered. But consider those situations 
87
Rory 
J. Conces
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110
that are less than tranquil. Given the ha-
tred and anger that often overwhelm the 
empathic response of those who espouse 
ethnic nationalism, nationalists may be-
come “combative” and stricken with a 
“malevolent” form of inattentiveness. It is 
not simply a “lack” of empathy, but rath-
er a set of contrary emotions that inhibit 
empathy. In the case of “benign” inatten-
tiveness or indifference, the Other has lit-
tle, if any, moral significance. In the case 
of combativeness, however, the situation is 
much worse, for it is likely that some harm 
will be done to the Other.35 The quanti-
ty and quality of felt interactions will be 
different. The possibility of respect and 
concern toward the Other at this point 
ceases; increasing the weal is not an op-
tion, but increasing the woe is, and this 
situation is contrary to empathy. In such 
a hostile situation, moral perception must 
be “jump-started” by the reinvigoration 
of empathy (or attentiveness), thereby al-
lowing one to once again recognize the 
Other’s moral significance and well-be-
ing.
But what exactly is to be reinvigorat-
ed? Unlike gathering evidence and draw-
ing inferences about someone else’s situ-
ation or placing oneself in a similar situ-
ation as another in order to experience as 
best as possible what it feels like to be in 
that other person’s predicament, empathy 
(or “participatory imagination”) “requires 
some type of distinction between self and 
35 Granted, the harm created by indifference is 
potentially greater than that caused by hatred, 
primarily because of its indiscriminateness 
(Vetlesen 1994: 252-253), but hatred has a 
certain directness to its harm that indifference 
does not possess.
other, and a type of imaginative displace-
ment” (Nussbaum 2013: 146). Here again, 
not all imaginative displacements (forms 
of perspective taking) are the same; they 
are not interchangeable. Results of em-
pirical psychological research have indi-
cated that there are two distinct forms 
of perspective taking, imagine other and 
imagine self, each evoking different emo-
tional effects as well as different motiva-
tions (Batson, Early, and Salvarani 1997). 
On the one hand, imagining how another 
feels (imagine other), especially if they are 
“vivid” imaginings, produces an increase 
in empathic emotions (like sympathy and 
compassion), reflecting an other-orient-
ed emotional response along with an al-
truistic motivation.36 On the other hand, 
imagining one’s own feelings if one were in 
the situation of the other produces em-
pathic emotions as well as personal dis-
tress, reflecting a self-oriented aversive 
emotional response along with egoistic 
motivation (Batson 1991, 2011). And so 
the work done by empathy as it pertains 
to moral perception and moral judgment 
is closely associated with empathetic 
emotions and not just the imaginings. It 
is because of these emotions that the con-
nection between imagine other and moral 
perception and judgment is solidified. The 
best way to promote moral performance 
is through the imaginative displacement 
of focusing on another’s feelings rather 
than one’s own.
Interestingly enough, the role that 
these empathic emotions play, whether 
36 See Nussbaum’s splendid job in laying out 
a nuanced discussion of compassion (2013: 
137-160, 314-377).
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they are directly the result of an imagin-
ing, goes well beyond placing us in a po-
sition to make a formal moral judgment. 
Long-winded moral judgments are im-
portant, but what is also of considerable 
importance is the work of empathic emo-
tions in intimately connecting us with 
the predicaments of others, which could 
trigger a pre-judgment act on our part to 
alleviate suffering and misery. Although 
moral judgments do a lot of work for us 
insofar as they are “normally multifaceted 
involving intrinsic motivation, belief, and 
emotion” (Campbell 2007: 348), empa-
thetic emotions by themselves can quick-
ly channel us to act in certain ways.
Some would have us believe that em-
pathy and its associated emotions are not 
hard to come by, that we continuously 
find ourselves in situations that allow us 
to learn how to broaden our attention to 
include others, to combat the constant 
temptation of narcissism.37 Vetlesen is one 
of those who believes that empathy (at-
tentiveness) can be learned. Supposedly, I 
can learn to see that a situation address-
es me in a certain way, and that positions 
me to take notice of the Other’s moral 
circumstance, to have empathetic emo-
tions, and to have concern for the Other 
(though Bateson and Nussbaum contend 
that imagine other is the sort of empa-
thy that needs to be experienced, and, no 
doubt, learned). This takes place in every-
day life, in what Tom Kitwood calls:
our countless small and unreflective 
actions towards each other, and the 
37 Nussbaum makes the problem of narcissism 
an important one in her work. See Nussbaum 
(2012: 20-58; 2013: 161-198).
patterns of living and relating which 
every human being gradually creates. 
It is here that we are systematically re-
jected or discounted, accepted or rejec-
ted, enhanced or diminished in our 
personal being (1990: 149). 
It is in everyday life that we create 
moral space, space within which we are 
a part of a web of “person-enhancing” re-
lationships characterized by dignity and 
respect. However, there seems to be a hol-
lowness to this proposal. Given that ev-
eryday life is full of both acceptance and 
rejection, enhancement and diminish-
ment, how is empathy to be learned? And 
how is it to be learned in the more stress-
ful conditions of combativeness, such as 
those fostered by ethnic nationalists? If 
people are continually rejected and have 
their personal being diminished, it is not 
likely that they will learn the attentiveness 
needed to feel empathy. Combativeness 
may prevail with its emotions of anger, 
envy, shame, and fear, thereby preventing 
a “healthy” emotional response and, thus, 
the debacle of moral performance.
Again, this is especially true of societ-
ies in which ethnic nationalism is a prin-
cipal component of peoples’ identity and 
a cause of much conflict. In fact, the mor-
al space in these situations could, at best, 
be “compressed,” and, at worst, “closed.”38 
It should be no surprise that compres-
38 Vetlesen notes that Nazi ideology encour-
aged the closing of not only the public space 
within Germany, but also the moral space, 
which “assumed the form of a suppression 
of the emotional capacities in each of them” 
(1994: 9).
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sion and closure are possibilities given the 
Othering that is invoked by the ontolog-
ical-psychological-ethical triad of an ide-
ology like ethnic nationalism. Ethnicity is 
the ontological category whose relevance 
is exaggerated, making it dominate in so 
many situations and contexts; persons are 
pigeonholed and labeled according to an 
ethnic identity. Identifying and labeling 
people is important for the ethnic nation-
alist. Of course, people in every society 
choose labels that parcel out group iden-
tities to individuals around them, thereby 
causing a certain degree of divisiveness 
and disharmony within their communi-
ties. But some identities are a bit more 
troublesome than others. This is especial-
ly true when identities like ethnicity and 
religion become internalized within com-
peting ideologies that have been linked 
to past violence.39 In this regard, ethnic 
nationalism begins to rear its ugly head.
But this ontology does not sit idle, 
disconnected from the rest of the person’s 
lived experience. It may be behind the 
“Gaze turned Glare” that a young Bosniac 
woman experiences as she walks past 
39 This work will not do justice to the impor-
tance of personal identity for people in the 
Balkans and elsewhere. Someone might infer 
from my work on this topic that I have inher-
ited the binary and oppositional view of eth-
nicities, that all conflict is reducible to Serb 
vs. Bosniac, Bosniac vs. Croat, and so forth. 
That is not the case. The human diversity that 
is found within the Balkans and elsewhere, 
for all intents and purposes, seems almost 
infinite. Not only are there a multitude of 
combinations of characteristics, but the cre-
ation of relationships through interaction and 
interdependence leads to endless novelty, and 
much of this is extremely important to people. 
a group of Serb men drinking coffee at 
Kafé Bar Davidoff in Srebrenica, a glare 
which reflects a xenophobic psychology, 
a fear or suspicion of the ethnic Other. 
Granted, fear can be useful in allowing us 
to survive dangerous situations (includ-
ing the fear that is evoked when coming 
face-to-face with signs like “Mines!” or 
“Falling Rocks”). Some fears are natural 
and self-focusing, while others are more 
or less taught and are Other-directed, 
such as those associated with the afore-
mentioned signs, and others that are as-
sociated with groups, including ethnic 
groups. Fear and suspicion can displace 
any concern or sympathy for the ethnic 
Other.40 Mistrust can be overwhelm-
ing. It short-circuits, at least temporar-
ily, how we see another person as being 
fully equal in human dignity and worth, 
and thus deserving of our respect. It de-
nies any real opportunity for a “person-
enhancing” relationship. Even though the 
respected Other possesses worth that is 
not contingent on our own valuation, the 
fear that displaces is ours regardless of its 
being warranted or not. The compression 
or closure of moral space, space within 
which dignity is recognized and respect 
given, has begun.
Apart from the ontology and psychol-
ogy of ethnic nationalism, there is its mo-
rality, which is also part of the compres-
sion/closure of moral space. In this case, 
a chauvinistic morality takes one’s own 
ethnic group to be morally superior to the 
other groups, which once again contrib-
40 I am indebted to Nussbaum’s insightful dis-
cussion of fear (2013).
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utes to the “hollowing out” of the Other’s 
human dignity and, thus, respect that he 
or she should be given. Some individu-
als may be morally superior to others in 
terms of their deeds and intentions, but 
that is a far cry from this moral exten-
sionism that characterizes ethnic nation-
alism. Ethnic nationalists fashion history, 
from actual events and lived history to 
remembered history and the narrative of 
a people, by embedding and protecting 
one’s own ethnic group with the moral 
high ground and by projecting onto one’s 
ethnic competitors qua enemies the ev-
erlasting negativity of chosen traumas. 
The web of history provides identity with 
some of its most enduring elements, giv-
ing enemies varying degrees of realism, is 
generically noted by the Canadian phi-
losopher Trudy Govier:
They are real, because they really do 
exist in the objective world of events. 
Yet at the same time, these enemies 
are constructed and imaginary, because 
they are in so many respects the pro-
jections of interpretations and fanta-
sies (2002: 151).
This same idea is set so powerfully, yet 
so cynically within the Balkan context by 
Michael Ignatieff when he writes that
truth is related to identity. What you 
believe to be true depends, in some 
measure, on who you believe yourself to 
be. And who you believe yourself to be 
is mostly defined in terms of who you 
are not. To be a Serb is first and fore-
most not to be a Croat or a Muslim. If 
a Serb is someone who believes Croats 
have a historical tendency towards fas-
cism and a Croat is someone who be-
lieves Serbs have a penchant for geno-
cide, then to discard these myths is to 
give up a defining element of their own 
identities (1996: 114).
  
I say cynically because Ignatieff appar-
ently believes there is “less to truth than 
meets the eye,” that one’s ethnic nation-
alist identity “in some measure” trumps 
what it takes to be a good epistemic agent. 
This simplistic thinking comes perilously 
close to providing an epistemological 
foundation for the ancient hatreds thesis 
that was prevalent in some circles during 
the war in Bosnia. It would imply that the 
ethnic nationalist is stuck in the groove of 
fanatical reasoning, thus eliminating the 
nationalist from being an agent for posi-
tive social change. Although Bosnia today 
is not a hotbed of progressivism, it is not 
what it was in 1995. For that matter, it is 
not what it was in 2012. Numbers of or-
dinary citizens have joined local plena in 
order to participate in meaningful politi-
cal discourse. Such citizen engagement is 
surely having some moderating influence 
on Bosnian identity politics. Yet xeno-
phobic psychology and chauvinistic mo-
rality prevails in Bosnia. And the results 
are not surprising. When group identities 
are formed to secure communities from 
their competitors, the formation of this 
communal cohesiveness often creates, for 
example, disdain for the ethnicity and re-
ligion of the Other. It is this disdain that 
is exhibited in xenophobic psychology 
and chauvinistic morality.
But the question remains: how do we 
expand or open moral space that will even-
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tually allow for moral perception or for 
seeing the morally relevant circumstances 
of peoples’ situations? In an earlier work, I 
emphasized that practical measures such 
as intercultural education, storytelling, 
and moral imagination have been used to 
expand the moral circle (or moral space), 
thereby “allowing them [people of differ-
ent cultures] to experience fellow-feel-
ing (or empathy) with the other, and to 
act in a more compassionate and civically 
responsible way toward them” (Conces 
2005: 166). Indeed, NGOs such as the 
network of Nansen Dialogue Centers 
have been successful at bringing together 
different peoples in order to deconstruct 
stereotypes and to enhance understanding 
between them. Their investment in civ-
il society building can generally be con-
strued in terms of offering safe space for 
the re-establishment of interpersonal rela-
tionships. Although these practical mea-
sures remain useful as devices to rekindle 
empathy, it now seems clear that their use 
and viability are predicated on people’s 
willingness to interact in close proximity, 
whether this is completely self-induced or 
partly brought about—through incentives 
and/or coercion—by the government, the 
International Community, or a NGO.
Close Proximity
However, before a person can exhibit a 
willingness to interact with the Other in 
close proximity, which ideally would in-
clude a face-to-face encounter, he or she 
must be able to do so. Of course, one’s 
ability may be hampered due to a bodi-
ly limitation (e.g., being a paraplegic), a 
psychological limitation (e.g., being an 
agoraphobic), or a social limitation (e.g., 
being threatened by members of one’s 
own group). However, there are other 
constraints, some of which deal with the 
physicality of places, that is to say, lo-
calities that have acquired meaning and 
value, such as the urban centers within 
which people live, work, and visit (Tuan 
1977). The constraints that come to mind 
are the result of urban design/architec-
ture and the placement of certain kinds 
of evocative objects.
Urban Design and Architecture
Urban design and architecture does not 
hold sway in every city and to the same 
degree. While some cities are the result 
of years of haphazard construction, others 
have at least some elements of planning 
and purpose no matter how misbegotten. 
In Political Emotions, Martha Nussbaum 
provides insightful treatments of these 
topics, noting that cities and buildings 
are more than just masses of steel and 
concrete; they have much to do with 
how people live their lives, whether they 
are “inside” or “outside” the cities and its 
buildings. Nussbaum writes in Political 
Emotions:
Cities bring people together from dif-
ferent ethnic, racial, economic, and re-
ligious backgrounds. Entrenched sus-
picions often divide them, and these 
suspicions can be either diminished 
or augmented by the layout of urban 
space. Urban architecture creates ways 
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of living, sometimes fostering friend-
ship, sometimes reinforcing fear. There 
are always grounds for fear in cities: 
crime, the volatility of employment, 
the diversity of groups and languages. 
But architecture can do a great deal 
to exacerbate fear into open hostility 
or to assuage it, encouraging problem 
solving in a spirit of fellowship (328). 
Her treatment of New Delhi, India 
and the Hyde Park neighborhood in 
which the University of Chicago resides 
go far in illustrating her points, precisely 
the sort of features that cities should not 
have if they are to be lenses for building 
humane relationships and communities.
New Delhi (not the old Delhi) is the 
sort of city ill-suited for human habita-
tion. As Nussbaum writes: “New Delhi 
seems like a place that is all about plan 
and not at all about people, a place where 
people, apart from the very affluent, have 
a hard time having a daily life. No place to 
walk to the market, to chat, to run into people 
of all trades, castes, and classes [my italics]” 
(329). Indeed, thanks to the British, a 
thriving interactive Hindu and Muslim 
urban community became fear ridden 
and fractured, the antithesis of fellowship 
that has yet to be reversed.
Nussbaum’s rendering of the University 
of Chicago in Hyde Park ends on a much 
more positive note. The founders of the 
university might have started with a so-
cially innocuous architectural plan to cre-
ate “an inward-looking scholarly commu-
nity” (333), separated from its surround 
environs in both mind and body, but that 
plan eventually exposed the same fear and 
fracture along race and class lines, epito-
mized by the Gothic style buildings with 
their courtyards and the grassy Midway 
Plaisance separating what was once the 
boundary between the university and the 
majority African American Woodlawn 
neighborhood to the south. The univer-
sity’s isolation was furthered by the maze 
of one-way streets and dead ends and 
occasional fence, some of which “stood 
as a symbol of hostility and an inward-
looking mentality—not malevolent, as 
were the British in Delhi, but disdainful 
toward the neighborhoods in a culpably 
obtuse manner” (335).
As far as this part of Chicago is con-
cerned, a remarkable turnaround has 
occurred over the past twenty years. The 
university administration now thinks of 
the university “as a partner of the neigh-
borhoods, pursuing interaction and asso-
ciated living, not to mention the mutual 
advantage of safety” (336). Indications of 
this shift include its operation of charter 
schools in Hyde Park, new construction 
of university facilities in other parts of 
Hyde Park and in Woodlawn (includ-
ing an arts center) as part of a revival of 
that neighborhood, university police pa-
trols in Woodlawn, and the revamping 
of the Midway as a safe point of inter-
action between the different communi-
ties. Although there remains much work 
to do, there has been significant progress 
towards openness and inclusivity, coop-
eration and partnership, and fellowship. 
Such changes are the result of civic de-
sign, the design of cities and towns with 
the goal of creating persons who are more 
inclined to work towards civic improve-
ment. These efforts have decidedly ad-
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dressed the proximity issue and improved 
the chances for meaningful interaction 
between Others.
Enclaves and Evocative Objects
Perhaps the starkest examples of localities 
in which members of different groups are 
not in close proximity, thereby making it 
exceeding difficult to interact with one 
another even if there were a desire to do 
so, are the ethnic enclaves found in the 
Balkans. I have written elsewhere about 
these enclaves and the role that evocative 
objects play in establishing and maintain-
ing (as well as reducing and eliminating) 
these monoethnic communities, but let 
me iterate a few key points set within the 
context of Bosnia and Kosovo (Conces 
2013abcd).
Multiethnic societies are those that 
not only exhibit pluralism of ethnic peo-
ples, but those peoples are in a dialogical 
(or multilogical) relationship. There is no 
such thing as a heterogeneous non-inter-
active multiethnic society. Interaction and 
integration are important aspects of the 
multiethnic society. Those societies that 
possess pluralism, although short on in-
teraction and integration, are more aptly 
referred to as being plural monoethnic 
composed of ethnic enclaves.
It is within these areas of high con-
centrations of more or less monoethnic 
communities that we find displays of 
evocative objects that are infused with 
meaning, thereby offering understand-
ing and stirring emotions within persons, 
prompting them to act in fairly predict-
able and well-defined ways. These objects 
that are tied to particular ethnic nation-
alist ideas and passions, when placed in 
the home, are fairly innocuous. It is un-
likely that they will offend or provoke 
outrage in onlookers, since the onlookers 
are either their owners or like-minded 
family and friends who have accepted an 
invitation to enter the home. They know 
full well what to expect. It is when these 
objects pass into public space, viewed by 
more and more people that problems be-
gin to arise. The space into which they 
enter becomes increasingly more public 
as the objects move farther from the inte-
rior of one’s home: from being hung from 
a wall in one’s bedroom to being draped 
over a window shutter, and then beyond 
to the car that is plastered with decals 
and driven around town, to the façade of 
government buildings, to city squares, to 
billboards on hilltops. It is as a result of 
this outward projection that these objects 
form parts of cityscapes; cognitively, emo-
tionally, and conatively informing people 
in different ways, acceptably for some and 
unacceptably for others.
For instance, members of a dominant 
ethnic group may see a particular array of 
objects as infused with meaning that har-
kens back to an ethnic-paramilitary group 
that was instrumental in the creation of a 
new state that is largely ruled by the dom-
inant ethnic group itself, thus empower-
ing those objects to stir pride in members 
of that same ethnic community. However, 
the ethnic group that had the territory 
wrestled from them and that are now just 
another minority may gaze at these same 
objects and infuse them with meaning of 
a past defeat with all its atrocities, stirring 
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in them seething hatred and desire for 
retribution. Clearly, these evocative ob-
jects serve as boundary markers, as clear 
indicators of domains of ethnic dwelling. 
Members of the various ethnic groups 
know full well where they are. Ethnic 
enclaves exhibit what is called an ethnic 
manifold, the defining feature of which 
is that any public position within the en-
clave would look and feel like a place of a 
particular ethnic community. This is be-
cause the evocative objects found in that 
enclave would be of one “ethnic” kind and 
would inform members of that particular 
ethnicity in ways unique to them.
These objects are much more, howev-
er. They are instrumental in creating and 
sustaining the enclaves themselves. They 
do this because evocative objects are both 
centripetal and centrifugal in their affect. 
Take the example above. On the one hand, 
the objects of the dominant group in that 
place encourage others of that group to 
come together. These objects are centrip-
etal for them; they make members of the 
dominant group feel welcomed in that 
place and help to build cohesion of that 
ethnic group. On the other hand, these 
same objects are centrifugal for members 
of the once powerful ethnic minority. 
These objects discourage them from be-
ing in that place, from interacting and es-
tablishing new relationships with the new 
dominant group. A particular message is 
sent to the minority: “You are not wel-
come! You are not one of us!”. Of course, 
the landscape would be very different in a 
place dominated by a minority-majority 
population because the centripetal and 
centrifugal outcomes would be reversed.
More insidious for both parties, how-
ever, is that by not having set foot in a 
place that place becomes a “pure idea” for 
them, a place that someone else has told 
them about. And so it is an “idea” that 
can be easily manipulated by each other’s 
local leaders, including politicians, mem-
bers of the Fourth Estate, educators, and 
hypointellectuals. These persons of influ-
ence can exploit ignorance, uncertainty, 
and fear to promote the xenophobia and 
chauvinism of their respective ethnic na-
tionalisms. Ethnicity or blood trump the 
fact that they share the same geography 
and, more importantly, that they are citi-
zens of the same country.
Such outcomes become more signifi-
cant when we realize that these evocative 
objects function not only to claim public 
space and make a place home, but they 
also make group identity more visible, par-
ticularly ethnic national identity, which in 
turn claims political power, control, and 
agency. Where individuals have made 
this group identity their dominant public 
identity, the perceived need for bound-
aries and control, both materially and 
symbolically, becomes great. Moreover, 
when the situation is one in which a once 
strong ethnic minority and a weak ethnic 
majority have traded places of power and 
governance, objects that are ethnically na-
tionalized become just another means by 
which the political struggle remains alive. 
And it remains alive especially for those 
leaders who want to take advantage of a 
“captive audience” to solidify their politi-
cal power and to increase divisiveness and 
uncertainty among their community.
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The Case of Bosnia and Kosovo
Before we begin to connect enclave liv-
ing and evocative objects/architecture 
with democracy building and the extent 
to which the hyperintellectual can even 
make a difference, we need to be clear 
about what sorts of objects and architec-
ture are at work in the Balkans, beginning 
with Bosnia and ending with Kosovo.
Although it all depends on where you 
are in Bosnia, one is usually not very far 
from objects and architecture that bear 
the mark of ethnic nationalism. Perhaps 
flags are one of the more common ob-
jects that invoke both positive and neg-
ative feelings in some of its citizens and 
visitors. Whether it is a time of celebra-
tion or a time of protest, flags are often 
used to make a statement and to create a 
boundary. On the night of July 21, 2008, 
the night that Radovan Karadžić, former 
President of Republika Srpska, was ar-
rested in Belgrade, hundreds of people in 
cars and on foot converged at the Eternal 
Flame (Vječna vatra), located at the in-
tersection of Marshall Tito Street and 
Ferhadija, the main pedestrian street in 
Sarajevo. It was here that some Bosniacs 
waved the flags of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1992-98), the Army of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1992-95), and Turkey. Photos taken of 
the early 2014 protests that turned vi-
olent in Tuzla and that spread to oth-
er cities in Bosnia also show the use of 
flags, including the flag of the Republic 
of Bosnia. More troublesome uses of 
flags can be found in the “divided” city of 
Mostar, where Croat nationalists regular-
ly display the flag of Croatia, as well as 
the Vatican flag.
Of course, flags are not the only ob-
jects that invoke nationalist sentiments. 
For example, there is the Mostar Derby, 
the football match between Mostar’s in-
tercity teams—FK Velež Mostar and 
HŠK Zrinjski Mostar—that is usually 
populated with fascist salutes, Swastikas, 
and Ustashi symbols. Fascist graffiti is 
also found throughout the city. It is quite 
common to find a U with a cross in it, 
the sign of the Ustashi. Monuments are 
often targeted by these graffiti “artists,” 
including the Monument to the Victims 
of Fascist Terror on which was painted 
various slogans (such as “Smrt Turcima” 
[“Death to the Turks”]). Clearly, the 
monument itself has become a battle-
ground for nationalists.41 Of course, evoc-
ative objects come in all sizes, some being 
quite large. The 33m tall cross that was 
erected on Hum Hill high above Mostar, 
visible from both Muslim and Christian 
quarters is a case in point. Then again an 
object can be physically altered in ways 
that make the re-appropriation by one 
group against another more indelible. 
Such an alteration and re-appropriation 
41 Bosnia’s monuments have this in com-
mon with the monuments surrounding the 
Spanish Holocaust. It is almost as if modern 
Bosnia and modern Spain are in competi-
tion with each other to show how their own 
battle over memory has been made indelible. 
Yet Bosnia has nothing that is comparable to 
Valle de los Caídos (The Valley of the Fallen), 
a place where people go to pay homage to 
their heroes, including Franco, whose crypt is 
located in the valley. See Treglown (2014) and 
Preston (2012).  
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took place in January 2014 in the city of 
Visegrad, the site of one of the worst war 
atrocities perpetrated by Serb paramili-
taries on the Bosniac people during the 
conflict. In this case, Bosnian Serb autho-
rities removed the word ‘genocide’ from a 
memorial plaque in the Straziste Muslim 
cemetery. With a grinder in hand, a 
worker, backed by a cadre of police of-
ficers, removed each letter, one by one, 
from the stone face of the memorial. (Not 
surprisingly, family members of the vic-
tims re-appropriated the memorial by us-
ing red lipstick and re-writing the word 
‘genocide’ on its stone face). Other exam-
ples include the road signs that have the 
Cyrillic text blacked out.
Kosovo is no different from Bosnia in 
this regard. Indeed, there is a preponder-
ance of public objects in Kosovo’s cities 
that carry different nationalist ideas and 
passions. Take, for example, the capital 
city of Prishtina. It becomes apparent 
after an hour long car ride through the 
city centre (‘qendra’) and the districts of 
Velania, Ulpiana, and Dardania that the 
flag most displayed by its Albanian res-
idents is the double-headed eagle of its 
southern neighbor Albania. And when-
ever there is a perceived challenge to 
Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, especially when Serbia is involved, 
you can be sure that the Albanian flag will 
be in mass, as was the case during the June 
2013 protest after Kosovo’s parliament 
approved an EU-brokered agreement on 
normalizing relations with neighboring 
Serbia. Of course, segments of the popu-
lation can rally to give its support as well, 
even with the blue Kosovo flag in hand. 
This was the case during the same month 
when residents of Prizren gathered to 
support Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Among the flags of Tur-
key, Albania, and Bosnia was the flag of 
Kosovo, with its six white stars symboliz-
ing its major ethnic groups.
This preponderance is confirmed when 
buildings in the capital are examined. Ta-
ke, for example, the Sports Complex in 
the central part of the city. The east end 
of the building faces the Newborn mon-
ument, which marks the Declaration of 
Independence of Kosovo. On the same 
end are an Albanian flag and a large pho-
to of Adem Jashari, an architect of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who 
was killed in 1998. The photo shows Ja-
shari dressed in full combat regalia. The 
international airport southwest of the 
capital is named in his honor, as well. But 
the use of the Albanian flag to claim pub-
lic space is also found within government 
buildings, such as in the office of the 
Ministry of Diaspora.
The Albanians in Kosovo are not the 
only ones displaying evocative objects that 
anchor their particular nationalist nar-
ratives. Granted, there are not many ob-
jects of Serbian nationalism in Prishtina 
itself (the unfinished Christ the Savior 
Cathedral at the university is the most ob-
vious), but crossing the Mitrovica Bridge 
over the River Ibar brings one face-to-
face with an array of objects that serve 
the Serb nationalist cause in their enclave 
of north Kosovska Mitrovica. Both state 
and civil flags of Serbia are commonly 
displayed. They can be seen hanging from 
light poles and university buildings, as 
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well as on a hilltop billboard. And it is 
not uncommon to find a photo of some-
one like Slobodan Milošević displayed 
in the business district. In addition, the 
Serbian dinar is used as currency and the 
music of the Serbian singer Ceca, known 
for her turbo folk, a blend of nationalist 
folk and techno music, can often be heard 
emanating from homes and cafes. The at-
mosphere is one of being in Serbia and 
not Kosovo.
Whether it be a flag like Albania’s 
double-headed eagle or Serbia’s trico-
lour, or a photo like that of Jashari atop 
a Sports Complex or a calendar photo of 
Milošević hanging on a bakery wall, these 
objects are clear indicators of domains of 
ethnic dwelling. They reflect the bound-
aries that describe the fragmented nature 
of Kosovo society.
Democracy and Deliberative Democracy
It must not be forgotten, however, that 
this newly formed state was forged from 
oppression and violence, in part between 
peoples of different ethnic groups. It is 
one thing to have democratic legitimacy 
based on the aggregation of preferences 
that occurs in voting, it is an entirely dif-
ferent matter to have that same legitima-
cy be the result of authentic deliberation. 
Perhaps the latter is especially important 
for Kosovo, a country fragmented into 
ethnic enclaves and whose Albanian elec-
torate continues to create an inequity in 
political power. This asymmetrical power 
structure raises some doubt to the legiti-
macy of the democracy itself. This doubt 
is furthered by the presence of enclaves 
because enclaves are not only crucibles 
within which ethnic identities become 
dominant for individuals, but they are 
also breeding grounds for competing eth-
nic nationalist ideologies.
The ontological-psychological-ethical 
triad of an ideology like ethnic national-
ism is destructive to a stable and harmoni-
ous peace and a well-functioning democ-
racy. The overbearing ethnic categories 
and the accompanying xenophobia and 
chauvinism are the culprits. Given that 
peace, harmony, and democracy are predi-
cated on a continuing exchange of ideas, 
the fact that enclaves push different eth-
nic peoples farther and farther apart leads 
to a short-circuiting of this exchange and 
produces increasing amounts of uncer-
tainty and mistrust. Enclaves are even 
more troublesome, since empathy and as-
sociated emotions (e.g., compassion and 
sympathy) allow a deep appreciation of 
how the Others experience their lives. If 
the Other is out of sight and out of mind, 
then it will be difficult to empathize with 
that person who you already dislike.
But to bring about a stable and harmo-
nious peace, and something resembling a 
deliberative democracy, requires that ideas 
are more than just exchanged. They are 
part of the process of reconciliation, the 
development of a mutual, conciliatory ac-
commodation between “formerly” antag-
onistic groups. Given that reconciliation 
requires interpersonal forgiveness, which 
entails the recognition of a moral judg-
ment followed by a letting go instead of 
seeking revenge, reasoning and the com-
monplace self-restraints on reasoning be-
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come crucial. And not, to be sure, the sort 
of weak reasoning (and lack of self-re-
straints) of the fanatic, which leads to the 
fanatic’s self-righteousness, intolerance, 
extreme certainty, credulity, and zealous-
ness.
For a democratic decision to acquire 
a certain degree of legitimacy, it must be 
the result of authentic deliberation. Such 
deliberation produces less partisanship, 
more sympathy with the plight of others, 
and increases commitment and consensus 
building. It does so by placing more val-
ue on evidence-based reasoning, agreeing 
that reasons need to be public and under-
standable, and being open to the possibil-
ity of changing one’s mind. These are the 
hallmarks of non-fanatical reasoning.
 
Deliberative Democracy 
and Civic Design in Kosovo
Unfortunately, little of this will occur in 
Kosovo unless there is reason-giving and 
emotionally situated dialogue that cuts 
across enclaves. In a sense, that would 
amount to the core activity of deliberative 
democracy running rampant. An effec-
tive way for this to take place is through 
people having face-to-face contact with 
others so that their worlds collide. So the 
more a society is composed of discrete 
ethnic groups, some of which have a long 
history of antagonism with one another, 
the more there is a need for integration. It 
is through integration and the demise of 
ethnic enclaves that Kosovo will become 
a multiethnic society.
A multiethnic Kosovo, however, can-
not simply be wished into existence. And 
enclaves will not suddenly disappear be-
cause of the deal that was struck between 
Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013. A mul-
tiethnic society will unfold through the 
creation of a collaborative environment, 
one that is in large measure inclusive, in-
tegrated and interactive, peaceful, and re-
spectful of difference rather than simply 
tolerant of it. How is this to be done?
It is in part accomplished through civ-
ic design, the design of cities and towns 
with the goal of creating persons who are 
more inclined to work towards civic im-
provement. In this case it includes a re-
duction or elimination of public evocative 
objects that are likely to be divisive along 
ethnic lines. Part of this divisiveness is 
created through the memories that are re-
awakened from the sight of these objects. 
The Albanian flags displayed on buildings 
and from cars throughout Prishtina and 
Serbian flags found on hilltops and light 
poles in north Kosovska Mitrovica are 
such objects. Dealing with them would 
go some way to making these places 
more hospitable to members of locally 
non-dominant ethnic groups.42 Indirectly, 
it would be a way to tinker with people’s 
memories and narratives. The hope is that 
42 I have written elsewhere that a legal ap-
proach that relies on drafting laws to deal 
with evocative objects that are overly provoc-
ative might be both unrealistic and unaccept-
able in Kosovo. A better approach would be to 
“promote reason-giving and emotionally situ-
ated (read empathetic) dialogue to create the 
self-imposition of standards that would cen-
sure those who display such objects in order 
to create ethnic enclaves. Surely, that would 
be legal and should be acceptable to most” 
(Conces 2013d: 13).
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at some point changing the physical land-
scape will allow more people to dwell in 
the same neighborhoods, feeling at home 
with one another in much deeper ways 
than could have been ever realistically 
hoped for by Albanians, Serbs, and oth-
ers when Kosovo became independent in 
2008. 
Hospitality and the Hyperintellectual
So I return to the question, how is this 
participatory attitude (or attentiveness) to 
be “triggered” so that intercultural educa-
tion, storytelling, and moral imagination 
can stir up empathic responses in people 
who are able to be in close proximity if 
they so desire? Or, how is attentiveness to 
be triggered so that the programs under-
taken by the Nansen Dialogue Centres 
stir up the empathic responses of its 
participants? The American theologian 
Martin Marty, in reference to “collisions 
of faiths,” provides us with a clue when 
he writes that the first address to colli-
sions between “strangers” should be “a 
call that at least one party begin to effect 
change by risking [my italics] hospitality 
toward the other” (2005: 1). It amounts 
to receiving the Other, someone who may 
be an acquaintance or a friend. However, 
in the most challenging situations, it 
means receiving a stranger, one who may 
be disliked or even hated. This occurs to 
some degree when the Nansen Dialogue 
Centres invite persons to participate in 
their programs, but more so when those 
same individuals apply what they have 
learned in their own communities. It 
is when they stray from the protective 
workshop and offer hospitality to oth-
ers that they face the difficult challenge 
of re-establishing relationships with their 
neighbors.
Whether it is friend or foe, there is 
always difference that erupts as Others 
who come face-to-face, not as if there 
were one person looking “into” a mirror 
and seeing himself or herself, but rather 
as two persons looking at each other 
through a glass window pane. No mat-
ter how “hospitable” the host becomes 
(no matter how dialogical they become), 
there will always be a space of Others 
(since dialogue presupposes difference or 
nonidentity [do not think of the more 
expansive ‘différance’ of the philosopher 
Jacques Derrida 1973]).
Hospitality begins with a perceived 
“need” to effect change in the world, not 
any sort of change, but positive change. 
It could be something as personal as a 
void which needs filling or a relationship 
that requires attending. But the perceived 
need may also be the precarious situation 
of the Other, some sort of crisis that must 
be addressed—one need within another. 
No matter the number of needs, “hospi-
tality is expressed in terms of the needs 
of the host, not in terms of the duty to 
the visitor, stranger or arrivant” (Nursoo 
2007). If there were no perceived need, 
there would be no welcome by a host; and 
if there were no welcome by a host, there 
would be no expression of hospitality.
In the welcoming of hospitality, there 
is an invitation “delivered” to the Other, 
thus making it conditional hospitality ra-
ther than unconditional or absolute hos-
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pitality (see Derrida 2000a, 2000b, 2005). 
It could be a verbal utterance of “Wel-
come,” a silent nod or hand gesture, a 
note, the opening of a door, or any com-
bination thereof. Unlike Derrida, how-
ever, I do not see this sort of hospitality 
that is made conditional by an invita-
tion, to involve, in any typical situation, 
rights, exchanges, contracts, or violence. 
For Derrida, conditional hospitality is 
composed of all this and is thus limited, 
whereas the law of hospitality is abso-
lute. He writes: “This principle demands, 
it even creates the desire for, a welcome 
without reserve and without calculation, 
an exposure without a limit to whoever 
arrives [l ’arrivant]” (2005: 6). And yet 
Derrida himself recognizes in hospitality 
part of what I find to be important in how 
persons live their lives:
Yet a cultural or linguistic commu-
nity, a family, a nation [I would add 
‘person’], cannot suspend, at the least, 
even betray this principle of absolute 
hospitality: to protect a ‘home’, with-
out doubt, by guaranteeing property 
and what is ‘proper’ to itself against 
the unlimited arrival of the other; but 
also to attempt to render the welcome 
effective, determined, concrete, to put 
it into practice [le mettre en oeuvre] 
(2005: 6).
The doors to my flat and office are 
locked. Those places are not available to 
the Other without an invitation to enter. 
It is up to me. Although I open up my 
home or office to the Other, it remains 
mine unless I decide otherwise. And there 
are certain expectations by both parties, 
expectations that might not be met. For 
example, I expect not to be murdered by 
the one I welcome; I suspect that the per-
son who enters my home or office expects 
the same. But it is the nature of expec-
tations to be open to the possibility of 
denial, of the expectation not being met. 
Hence, the invitation and entry are by 
their very nature “risky.” Welcoming the 
Other includes a “risk,” which means that 
the host, as well as the “invited” one, who 
must decide whether to take a risk by ac-
cepting the hospitality, could incur some 
cost even if the cost were simply that the 
interaction does not enhance or open the 
moral space between the two.
Could hospitality with its invitation 
and risk taking also be a part of the life of 
the hyperintellectual? Yes, if we take the 
virtue of courage to be a form of risk tak-
ing, and a risk taking that is prior to the 
ability to continue criticism when one’s 
fellow citizens are silent or complicit. It 
is a risk of extending an invitation to the 
Other to engage in the cooperative ven-
ture of hospitality. By not taking sides 
and being a good epistemic agent, the hy-
perintellectual is behaving courageously 
and taking a risk of extending an invita-
tion to everyone as Other. It is through 
defending and criticizing positions of all 
parties at some point that the hyperintel-
lectual offers the gesture of hospitality. 
It is risking hospitality in its broadest, in 
its most non-ideological sense, that the 
hyperintellectual further contributes to 
democracy building. This could be the 
hyperintellectual’s most important con-
tribution. Perhaps hospitality rather than 
oppositionality is what the hyperintellec-
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tual strives for on the road to democra-
tization. The outcome is uncertain, but if 
successful, showing hospitality
inevitably involves us in a sympathetic 
passing over into the other’s life and 
stories and a coming back into our own 
life and stories enriched with new in-
sight. To see life through a story which 
requires us to welcome the stranger is 
to be forced to recognize the dignity 
of the stranger who does not share our 
story (Fasching 1994: 9). 
Clearly, taking such a risk means that 
we are forced to attend to the Other and 
to be addressed by the moral circum-
stance, thereby provoking concern and re-
spect for the Other. Unfortunately, there 
is no easy solution to preventing ethnic 
nationalism from constraining moral spa-
ce through demonizing the Other and 
leading people to be inordinately combat-
ive. As I previously suggested, however, 
empathy appears to be sometimes over-
whelmed by combativeness in members 
of different ethno-religious groups, such 
that the resulting animosities are to a de-
gree taken to be a part of their psyches. 
But empathy need not be lost, misplaced, 
or overwhelmed for long; it can be rekin-
dled, though it may take great effort on 
the part of many. It is at this juncture that 
hospitality becomes important, for one 
must decide to take a “risk” and extend 
hospitality to the Other. The absence of 
such a gesture may well result in the mor-
al space remaining compressed or closed. 
In a word, hospitality is a portal through 
which we all can enter shared moral space, 
though there is no guarantee that we will 
all make the trip. But it is when hospital-
ity takes the form of intercultural educa-
tion, storytelling, and moral imagination 
that real progress is likely; and there is no 
reason why the hyperintellectual cannot 
become a participant in this process. This 
is especially true of the hyperintellectual 
who is perhaps more like a moral theo-
rist, someone who projects new concep-
tions of moral life through acts of moral 
imagination (see Louden 1992: 152-153).
While I agree that the hyperintellec-
tual can, in a very practical sense, help 
others to engage, it is expected that some 
individuals may still not be inclined to be 
hospitable, in which case they must be 
“prompted” to do so. This is where the IC 
must be willing to accept the paradox of 
democracy formation as a condition of its 
work in religiously and ethnically frag-
mented societies. If ethno-religious com-
munities are unwilling to engage with one 
another, then the IC must dictate institu-
tions and policies that require members 
of these communities to work and live 
together, allowing them greater oppor-
tunities to engage in hospitality so as to 
move closer to creating their own democ-
racy. Ultimately, “risk taking” is what will 
bring about a democratic culture in the 
Balkans. “Playing it safe” will only perpet-
uate the undemocratic status quo. Change 
will come about when enough people rec-
ognize, both theoretically and practical-
ly, that hospitality is essential for moral 
agency, and that concern and respect for 
one’s fellow human beings, as well as for 
the creation of a democratic culture are 
required. Once again, the hyperintellec-
tual can be useful, though in this case it 
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would be in terms of offering theoreti-
cal (philosophical) support for the mor-
al legitimacy of the IC’s peace-building 
efforts. By clarifying these efforts as in-
stances of self-protectionism and auton-
omy-enhancing, the hyperintellectual can 
make strides in reducing the divisiveness 
between parties who are at odds with one 
another.
However, to say that the hyperintel-
lectual can “make strides” by employing 
a philosophical argument, often made 
impenetrable by formal logic and tech-
nical language, so as to demonstrate that 
the peace-building efforts would be more 
justice-, equality-, or liberty-producing 
than its contenders, is not to say it is the 
argument that must prevail. Indeed, there 
may be many prevailing arguments unless 
they are reduced in some arbitrary fash-
ion. This idea of “contrary positions that 
simultaneously survive,” developed most 
prominently by Amartya Sen, can serve as 
a reminder that the absence of a zero sum 
debate need not bring decision-making 
to an immediate halt. Sen puts the point 
thus: “Arbitrary reduction of multiple and 
potentially conflicting principles to one 
solitary survivor, guillotining all the other 
evaluative criteria, is not, in fact, a prereq-
uisite for getting useful and robust con-
clusions on what should be done” (2009: 
4).43
I have sketched a theoretically com-
pelling framework for situating the hy-
perintellectual in modern-day civil soci-
43 Sen (2009: 14) aptly cites Bernard Williams 
in this regard: “Disagreement does not neces-
sarily have to be overcome” (Williams 1985: 
133).
ety building and democratization, as well 
as a practical scheme that recognizes this 
intellectual as a catalyst for the creation 
of democratic culture. Although I have 
perhaps failed to make a convincing ar-
gument tying the hyperintellectual to 
democratization, it nonetheless strikes 
me as encouraging that the inflationary 
model of morality has brought us to a 
plausible framework for the best the hy-
perintellectual has to offer. It is my hope 
that this effort to offer a practically ori-
ented theoretical framework in this way 
can not only limit the slandering of the 
intellectual in the public domain, but also 
may open up new possibilities for the cre-
ation of democratic culture in places like 
the Balkans.
Estrangement qua Suicide:
The Curse of the Hyperintellectual
In a sense, the hyperintellectual informs 
us all, including the nationalist and the 
interventionist, that our predicament is 
like staring at bits of shattered mirror. As 
we poke at the shards, declares Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, we see that
each shard reflects one part of a com-
plex truth from its own particular an-
gle....[However] you will find parts 
of the truth (along with much error) 
everywhere and the whole truth no-
where. The deepest mistake,...is to 
think that your little shard of mirror 
can reflect the whole (2006: 8).
Understanding can only be achieved 
within a group. But the costs and bene-
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fits are not distributed equally within that 
group. The work of the hyperintellectual 
involves a collective-action problem, in-
sofar as all those who live that “way of 
life” incur the costs, but huge segments 
of society share the benefits that might 
come from such work. Perhaps this is the 
best that the hyperintellectual can hope 
to attain. The hyperintellectual has con-
templated, intervened, taken a risk, and 
incurred the cost. The hyperintellectual 
goes about trying to change the world 
but at the price of alienating almost ev-
eryone. But this is to be expected given 
the five defining but often countervailing 
features that drive the hyperintellectual. 
While being the caring insider, person 
of action, and the political educator may 
be quite appealing to many, wielding an 
unrestrained critical eye in a non-parti-
san (quirky) way may eventually drive 
away any supporters, thereby reducing his 
or her effectiveness. To put this in more 
concrete terms, it is when colleagues do 
not respond to emails or return phone 
calls, producers cancel television inter-
views, blogs become unpopular and offi-
cials of a university or other institutions 
question their “loyalty” and, thus, their 
usefulness, that the impact of the hyper-
intellectual within civil society begins to 
shrink. Being marginalized may be the 
universal experience of the hyperintellec-
tual. Perhaps at some point a threshold is 
reached whereby the hyperintellectual is 
silenced.
Although reason may well continue 
to rule, visceral feelings of inadequacy, 
resentment, and rage will remain. This 
is the existential fury that must be re-
strained. Yet it is only by living against the 
grain and enduring the estrangement and 
fury that the hyperintellectual holds to 
his or her vocation, readying a new set of 
projects for the following day. Day in and 
day out the hyperintellectual transgresses 
boundaries and combats monological and 
dialogical dogmatism. It is a struggle that 
is soothed by various technologies; but 
the Internet does not inoculate the hy-
perintellectual against estrangement. But 
so what! The fact that there is estrange-
ment to be endured is itself a kind of 
success—for it means that courage, com-
passion, and hospitality are still alive. The 
practice of virtue remains alive and well. 
Perhaps the economist E.F. Schumacher 
had it right:
The violence that is in the process of 
destroying the world is the cold, cal-
culating, detached, heartless, and re-
lentless violence that springs from 
over-extended minds working out of 
control of under-developed hearts. A 
person who does not feel his thoughts 
but merely entertains them...is capable 
of limitless violence....
Modern civilization can survive 
only if it begins again to educate the 
heart…for modern human beings are 
now far too clever to be able to survive 
without wisdom (1977: 313).
If nothing else, a sense of such sin-
gle-mindedness and sacrifice for a more 
democratic and humane society offers 
people a basis for hope even when cir-
cumstances seem to provide none. Yet 
there is never any guarantee of success 
beyond this minimalist sense. The hy-
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perintellectual may come and go without 
having any discernible impact on the di-
rection of the society. 
Perhaps the effectiveness of any single 
hyperintellectual is often short-lived, al-
though the collective impact of a growing 
number of hyperintellectuals may have 
long-term consequences for democratiza-
tion efforts. Gaining momentum for such 
change may be even more likely if the si-
phon theory of social change is adopted 
by the hyperintellectual; if he or she can 
“locate the strategic set of people…who 
could create such momentum” (Lederach 
2005: 94). If enough of the right people in 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere become 
convinced that the world is not black and 
white, democracy and human relations 
may have a better chance to spread.
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